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ABSTRACT 
In many respects this thesis is limited in that the focus is primarily on th
e 
foreshore and seabed issue itself, rather than wider constitutional issues. T
his thesis 
has three objectives. The first is to provide the reader with an historical cont
ext to the 
recent Court of Appeal decision Ngati Apa
1
, by examining the common law doctrine 
of aboriginal title and in particular two dubious decisions Wi Parata v The B
ishop of 
Wellington2 and In Re Ninety Mile Beach
3
. The second objective is to examine the 
Marlborough Sounds litigation in light of the historical context with the u
nderlying 
theme being that the final Court of Appeal decision should not have co
me as a 
complete surp1ise to the government. The final objective is to ou
tline the 
government's proposal to pre-empt any attempt by Maori to lay claims 
with the 
Maori Land Court as allowed by the Court of Appeal, and scrutinize the
 proposal 
against the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi 1840. The theme of this pa
per is the 
consideration of aboriginal title, in the context of the foreshore and seabed. 
The text of this paper ( excluding abstract, table of contents, footnotes, bib
liography 
and appendices) comprises approximately 14763 words. 
1 Ngati Apa v Attorney General (19 June 2003) Court of Appeal CAI 73/01, 7
5/02. 
2 Wi Parata v The Bishop of Wellington (1877) 3 NZ Jur (NS) SC 72. 
3 In Re Ninety Mile Beach [1963] NZLR 461 (CA). 
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I INTRODUCTION 
In 1935 the Crown Solicitor wrote to the Solicitor-General: "The consensus of 
opinion (in which I fully concur) is that the claim of the Crown is weak. The 
Department [ of Lands and Survey] would prefer that the matter, if possible, be 
removed from the jurisdiction of the Native Land Court."
4 This statement regarding 
the asse1iions that the foreshore belongs to the Crown by a presumption of English 
common law, unbeknown to the author of those words, would become the very 
stance taken by the Comi of Appeal in June 19 2003.
5 While the 1963 Court of 
Appeal decision In Re Ninety Mile Beach nullified the Crown's concerns to a certain 
extent, the Crowns claim to the foreshore, remained precarious, due to the dubious 
authority of that case. With the release of Ngati Apa, and the subsequent knee-jerk 
reactions from the Crown, it would be fair to say that the Crown had been caught 
napping on the issue. 
In Ngati Apa, the Court of Appeal ruled on a narrow jurisdictional question that 
the Maori Land Court has jurisdiction to investigate customary ownership in the 
foreshore and seabed.
6 The immediate effect of the decision was to open the way for 
Maori applicants to seek title to areas of the foreshore and seabed in the Maori Land 
Court previously had been prevented by In Re Ninety Mile Beach. While in many 
ways the case does not state anything new,7 it is in the overruling of In Re Ninety 
Mile Beach in which the 2003 Court breaks new ground. 
That Maori may possibly, however remote, obtain property rights in the 
foreshore and seabed, evoked national outcry from a cross section of New Zealand 
society. Of particular concern is the possibility of fee simple title in the foreshore and 
seabed and the fear of Maori excluding access to beaches around New Zealand. 
Likewise, the Court of Appeal ruling stirred strong reaction among Maori. Apart 
4 Cited in RP Boast "In Re Ninety Mile Beach Revisited: The Native Land Court and the Forshore in 
New Zealand Legal History" (1993) 23 VUWLR 145, 162. 
5 Tom Bennion, "The Claim of the Crown is Weak" (May 2003) Maori Law Review 1. 
6 Ngati Apa v Attorney-Genera !(19 June 2003) Court of Appeal CAI 73/01, 75/02. 
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from the jurisdictional finding, which is in itself of momentous significance, th
e 
decision also highlights wider issues of the legal recognition of Maori customa
ry 
rights, including property rights, the status given to such rights and how underlyin
g 
constitutional issues are to be resolved between the Crown and Maori now and in th
e 
future. 8 
In response to Ngati Apa the government issued its proposal to resolve this 
apparent contest between interests of Maori customary property rights and th
e 
interests of the public at large. In essence the government intends to legislate 
to 
declare the foreshore and seabed to be in the "public domain", or land belonging 
to 
no one, while precluding Maori from being issued a fee simple title to those area
s. 
The reforms as proposed however fail to deliver the 'win win' result promised. 
Apparent from a reading of the document is that Maori customary property 
rights will be severely restricted in an attempt to appease the wider public. As
 a 
result, Maori have been unequivocal in rejecting the proposal. All consultation h
ui 
have outright rejected the proposal. Any solution to the current climate of uncertain
ty 
is hard to see, however with an issue of such importance, time should be taken to g
et 
the solution right. If the Crown fails to incorporate the views of Maori whe
n 
developing the final proposal, inevitably breaches of the Treaty of Waitangi 184
0 
("the Treaty") will result. Breaches are potentially on two fronts; an inadequa
te 
process and in the proposal itself. 
While aboriginal rights have received scattered recognition in New Zealand 
courts, the government has generally has stayed clear of aboriginal rights
9
, but rather 
7 Bennion, above, 1. 
8 Interview with Maui Solomon, (The Breakfast Show, TVNZ, Wednesday 30 July 2
003) transcript 
frovided by Newztel News Agency. 
See for example the generic Deeds of Settlement clause, which reads "Nothing 
in this Deed 
extinguishes or limits any aboriginal title or customary rights that [iwi] may have, 
or constitutes or 
implies any acknowledgment or acceptance by the Crown that such title or rights exist
 either generally 
or in any particular case ... " Ngati Awa Deed of Settlement 1.6 (a). 
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has approached customary 1ights from the context of the Treaty.
10 Ngati Apa 
however has thrown aboriginal 1ights back to the forefront of public debate and 
indeed the government's agenda. In many ways this thesis is limited in that it does 
not consider the wider constitutional or policy issues that Ngati Apa has given 
renewed impetus to. Nor does it attempt to detail the relationship that Maori have 
with the land and the sea. Rather this thesis considers the issue of aboriginal title, 
what it is and how it applies in New Zealand, in the context of the foreshore and 
seabed. The report then reviews case law regarding the Crown's actions in relation to 
the assumption of ownership of the foreshore and seabed and the lack of regard for 
aboriginal rights. Finally the paper considers the response of the Crown to the Court 
of Appeal's decision and draws conclusions on the approach taken and the impact on 
aboriginal 1ights and Treaty of Waitangi obligations. 
II ABORIGINAL TITLE 
The judicial identification of the English common law principles relating to 
the effect of British sovereignty on pre-colonial legal systems is sourced from the 
begi1ming of the seventeenth century. The presumption of continuity recognised in 
Campbell v Hall
11
, found that British sovereignty of itself did not disrupt the pre-
existing legal system of the indigenous habitants. This presumption included 
indigenous property rights. Amodu Tijani v Secretary, Southern Nigeria: 
12 
A mere change in sovereignty is not to be presumed as meant to disturb rights of 
private owners; and the general terms of cession are prima facie to be construed 
accordingly. The introduction of the system of Crown grants which was made 
subsequently must be regarded as having been brought about mainly, if not 
exclusively, for conveyancing purposes, and not with a view to altering substantive 
titles already existing. 
10 Rt Hon Helen Clark, Prime Minister Foreshore and Seabed: Protecting Public Access and 
Customa,y Rights: Consultation Paper (Wellington, 2003), 8. 
11 Campbell v Hall (1774) Lo Ft 655 Mansfield LJ. 
12 Amodu Tijani v Secreta,y, Southern Nigeria [ 1921] 2 AC 399. 
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The purpose of the doctrine of abo1iginal title was to facilitate the harmony of 
two cultures, to avoid an otherwise chaotic society.
13 The Crown's sovereignty is 
expressed as a blend of imperium or the right to govern, and dominium, or the 
Crown's position as ultimate owner of all land in the colony.
14 As a consequence of 
acquisition of sovereignty the colonising power, acquired a radical or underlying 
title. 15 In Mabo v State of Queensland [No 2} Brennan J described radical title as "a 
postulate of the doctrine of tenure and a concomitant of sovereignty." 
16 The effect of 
radical title was recently discussed in Te Runanganui of Te Ilea Whenua Inc Society v 
Attorney General: 17 
On the acquisition of the ten-itory, whether by settlement, cession or annexation, 
the colonising power acquires a radical or underlying title which goes with 
sovereignty . . . But, at least in the absence of special circumstances displacing the 
principle, the radical title is subject to the existing native rights . They are 
usually, although not invariably, communal or collective. It has been 
authoritavely said that they cannot be extinguished (at least in times of peace) 
otherwise than by the free consent of the native occupiers, and then only to the 
Crown and in strict compliance with the provisions of any relevant statutes. 
This right of eminent domain is distinct from the Crown's feudal title, plenum 
dominium. 18 However, in inhabited territories such as New Zealand where 
feudalism, the theory of the Crown as the ultimate owner of all land, was introduced, 
the Crown was technically treated as 'owning' the land occupied by the aboriginal 
people. 19 Taken this far, it would seem that the law denies land rights to the original 
occupants, which is the exact view taken by New Zealand courts for 100 years 
13 PG McHugh The Maori Magna Carta: New Zealand law and the Treaty of Waitangi (Oxford 
University Press, Auckland, 1991) 104. 
14 PG McHugh "Aboriginal servitudes and the Land Transfer Act 1952" (1986) 16 VUWLR 313, 316. 
15 Te Runanganui of Te Ika Wh enua Inc Society v Attorney General [1994] 2 NZLR 20, 23. 
16 Mabo vState of Queensland [No 2} (1992) 175 CLR 1, 48. 
17 Te Runanganui of Te lka Wh enua Inc Society v Attorney General, above, 23-24. See also, Te 
Runanga O Muriwhenua v Attorney-General [1990] 2 NZLR 641. 
18 PG McHugh The Maori Magna Carta: New Zealand law and the Treaty of Waitangi (Oxford 
University Press, Auckland, 1991) 103, footnote 18. 
19 PG McHugh The Maori Magna Carta: New Zealand law and the Treaty of Waitangi (Oxford 
University Press, Auckland, 1991) 104. 
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begirming with Wi Parata v The Bishop of Wellington
20
. What these courts failed to 
recognise, was that pre-existing property rights of Maori burdened the Crown's 
title. 21 Any property interest of the Crown in land was therefore dependent on pre-
existing customary interest and its nature. 
A Content of Aboriginal Title 
The content of the aboriginal title is infonned by the customary practices of 
the indigenous people, which is required to be proved as a matter of fact.
22 
"The 
nature and incidents of native title must be asce1iained as a matter of fact by 
reference to those Jaws and customs."
23 In New Zealand the content may also 
depend on the approach of the Comi considering the case. 
24 
Such rights are not equivalent to common law concepts, but as noted m 
Canada: 
They are rights held by a collective and are in keeping with the culture and 
existence of that group. Courts must be careful then to avoid the application of 
traditional common law concepts of property as they develop their 
understanding of ... the sui generis nature of aboriginal rights.
25 
Depending on the custom and practice, the title may be so comprehensive as 
to amount to a claim of exclusive ownership over land leaving little room for title 
sourced from the Crown becoming vested in non-traditional owners.
26 This title is 
tem1ed territorial title. On the other hand non-territorial title will arise where a non-
exclusive right to carry out a custom is insufficient to support a claim to title to land 
20 Wi Parata v The Bishop of Wellington (1877) 3 NZ Jur (NS) SC 72. 
21 PG McHugh The Maori Magna Carta: New Zealand law and the Treaty of Waitangi (Oxford 
University Press, Auckland, 1991) 104. 
22 Te Runanganui o Te !ka Whenua Inc Society v Attorney-Genera! [1994] 2 ZLR 20, 23 (CA). 
23 Mabo v Queensland [No 2} (1992) 107 ALR 1, 42 (HCA) Brennan J. 
24 Te Runanganui o Te !ka Whenua Inc Society v Attorney-General, above, 24. 
,5 
- Sparrow v The Queen [ 1990] 1 SCR 107 5. 
26 PG McHugh "Aboriginal servitudes and the Land Transfer Act 1952" (1986) 16 VUWLR 313, 316. 
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itself, or the claimants are precluded from asserting a full territorial title by virtue of 
some form of extinguishment.27 
B Extinguishment 
Importantly extinguishrnent of the rights can only occur by explicit 
legislation or voluntary relinquishment by the traditional owners. This principle was 
espoused in R v Symonds: 28 
[I]t cannot be too solemnly asserted that [ native title] is entitled to be respected, that it 
cannot be extinguished ( at least in times of peace) otherwise than by the free consent 
of the Native occupiers. But for their protection, and for the sake of humanity, the 
Government is bound to maintain, and the Courts to assert, the Queen's exclusive 
right to extinguish it. 
The Legislature must display a 'clear and plain' intention to extinguish the 
rights. 29 As aboriginal title is usually conceived of as a bundle of rights, 
extinguishrnent may be partial or full and final. 30 Where a partial extinguishrnent title 
has occurred, the ten-itorial tile is reduced to a non-territorial title, no claim to the 
exclusive use and occupation of the land can subsist.31 However this does not 
necessarily extinguish rights that are independent of the ownership of the land, 32 
such as the right to fishing as found in Te Weehi v Regional Fisheries Officer. 33 
C Critique of Aboriginal Title 
While the doctrine of common law title recognises and protects pre-existing 
customary property, it is by no means beyond criticism. It is patent that the doctrine 
21 R v Van der Peet [1996] 2 SCR 507; 137 DLR (4th) 289. 
28 R v Symonds (1847) [1840-1932] NZPCC 387 (SC), 390. 
29 Faulkner v Tauranga District Coun cil [1996] 1 NZLR 357. 
30 PG McHugh "Aboriginal servitudes and the Land Transfer Act 1952" (1986) 16 VUWLR 313,322. 
3 1 PG McHugh "Aboriginal servitudes and the Land Transfer Act 1952" ( 1986) 16 VUWLR 313, 321. 
32 PG McHugh "Aboriginal servitudes and the Land Transfer Act 1952" (1986) 16 VUWLR 313, 325 . 
33 Te Weehi v Regional Fisheries Officer [ 1986] 1 NZLR 680. 
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1s a paternali sti c method or· reco ,111 s1ng pre-ex isting Maori land ri ghls . .1
4 
Some 
Maori, along w ith other indi genous peoples', v iew the common law rules, as havin) 
developed as part of "a li sco urse of di spossess ion", which subordinate indi •enous 
ri ghts lo the preva iling interests of the ·oloni zi n, Stalc.
1
~ on ·epts su ·h as 
"custo111 ,11y title" as defi ned hy the common law he amc less than full ri ghts, 
cvi cl en ·eel in such ri ght s being alienable only to lhc Crown and in the ability or the 
( 'rown lo ex tin 1ui shecl tlt c ri •hls.
1
c, 
The weak ness or the ·ornrnon law ri •hls are emphasised by the dominant 
concepti on of' ahori •inal titl e 1i •hts as a bundl e of' ri ,hts.
11 
This theory sees 
aho1 i •in ,tl title as a bundle o r· di stin ·t severable and enum erable ri d1t s and interes ts 
lh;1I ·an be exer ·isl:d on l,111cl . I lowevl:r ,ts di s ·usscd in North J' s minorit y de ·ision in 
/Vcs/('m !1 11strolio v /Vort/ 18 , the bundle of' ri •his theo ry docs nol sil Wl:11 with 
indi , ·nous pl:rspe ·ti vl:s on th l: ir relation ship w ith the land . 
19 
The theory assumes 
propiidary Ii •ht s ·an h · divi(kd up, how ·vl:r J\hori •inal (and Maori) peopl e do nol 
111 ;1kl: such divi sions b ·twe ·n prop ·rt y ri •hts .'
10 
' I he lypica l h1111dk of' 1i ghl s a11a lys is docs 1101 lake ac '(H111t of' spi,itual rclatio11ship 
with la11d whi ch is so pi vo tal to /\ ho, i ; i11al prnpk ... /\ s Wa tso11 ar •ucs, to f;1il 
p1opc1 ly lo llTOF, lli sc i11di t•l·11rn1 s ow1ll'ISl11p i11 a way whi ·Ii adnp1atcl y 1L'fkcts 
111d1gc 11 ous ow11e1 s l11p of the land is lo ·011ti11u L· the co lo11isatio11 and opp1 css io11 of' 
111d1ge 11011s pL·opk . ·11 
14 Mo:i11a .lackso 11 "'/'h <'f'<' nn· o/, /1 ,1:nt1011.1· 1/wr<'" A Co11.\'//l<n11io11 r1( A/1Jori lfr.111011s1/,i/itic.1· a11t! 
()/,/1w111011 .,· 111 N1 ·.w1rrl to 1/w S,·r,/l('r/ n11rl 1:rm·shor<' · h1tp://www.a1c11:1.m• .11'.f}sh1110:111a .ht1t1 · ( la s t 
accessed I ( >ctohe1 )00 I) . 
" .Jackson, :1hovc. 
11
' .lackso 11 , ahovc. 
11 l' aty l\:11 1l l'I 11 '<'.l'lc'/'// , /11s1m /1n 1• ll'nrrl (hi<' St, ·11 /.'r11wr11·rl n1ul '/'11•0 Sr,·11.1· Unc/.. Nari1'<' '/'111< • 111/// 
//1(' l/111111!<" of N1,1:h1s , /,w/1 •.1·,.1· 1)0001 Mlll R I 7 
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Mon.:over, the ·o- xisten ·e or aborioinal tit!' and the En ,(ish I 'nal system 
r 'al 'S th' dan •er or quatin, native ·ustom , ith English 1, 1al ·c n ·cpL .'12 This 
danger may dismiss cust rnwry interests a · less than re ·0°nisabk Fnglish legal 
·sl,1les. ·11 II may also ·aus' lesser ·uslomar interests to b ' overstated to conl'trnn to 
!I ng lish lc 0 al 'Slales.'1'1 /\s courts ha ' struggled t) re ·on ·ilc ·ustomary notions or 
ri •hls in prop Tly , ilh lh !I nglish proper! ·on· 'pts or ownership, ii has be n a 
conslunl ·0111pl;1inl or i11dige11ous peopl ·s around th ' world that th ·0111111011 law 
docs 1101 :1d quat 'ly refle ·t Ill' lru ' customs ol'thos •roups. 
Ill TIIE DOCTRINE OF AIJORl(,'IN. IL TITLE .·IS : IPl'L/1;'1) IN NEW 
XE·ILIND 
A ModUied Co11ti1111i~1· 
In New Zealand lh' pr ·sumplion or ·onlinuil , :1s ol' a modi lied form . Post 
13rilish a1111ex :1liun lrib;tl lcnur' co11li11ued to be re gul;it ·d b ·ustomar la, , hut this 
I ·nur · was limited lo i(aori .'1~ Non I\ l:1ori had to cslablish their tit!' lo land l'ro111 :i 
( 
•I(, 11 . . . - . row11 granl. enc' II 1s corrc ·t to spe;1k or a ' 111odil1ed co11t111uit ' :1s th ' 
·onlinuil w:1s limited b th' alie,rnhilil lo lh · Crown on! and it s subs ·qu ·nl 
granle 's.'11 Thus lh' acquisition or sovcr ·iPnl 111 ·, Zealand result 'd in a du:ll 
s stem ol' land t 'nur ·, an :1bori ginal t ·nur' b:1scd 011 cuslom:1r l:111d knur ', :111d a 
l''udal I ·m11 based on 11nglish law.'1x Important! , whit ' lh' Cn1, 11 re ·o 1 11ises 
ahori •in:tl lit!·, lh:11 ;1bori 1 in:tl till' is 1101 Crow11 dcri ·d .'
11
) 
In terms 01· th, Tre:ll or \Vaita11 gi, allhou •Ii Maori cuslomar ri 1hls , ' r · 
expli ·ill rc ·ognis ·d :111d protected, ii was si111pl de ·laralor or lh' commni1 1:1\ 
,1.> :/111 (1( /11 /'r j 1111 1• S t'<Tt' /111 •. So 11tllt'111 1,1;,·m1 11 <) ! 1 I - C \9tJ . 
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'
1
'
1
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•
1
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"
1 Mel 111 •It , aim l', .l 1 <) . 
imported into New Zealand.50 The Treaty did not assert either in doctrine or in 
practice anything new in the guarantee of Maori customary land, nor in providing 
that the Crown's pre-emptive right to extinguish it by purchase. 
51 This fact was 
recognised early in New Zealand. Chapman J noted in R v Symonds that " in 
solemnly guaranteeing the native title, and in securing what is called the Crown's 
pre-emptive right, the Treaty of Waitangi ... does not assert anything new or 
unsettled."52 This conception of the Treaty was notably rejected by Wi Parata, which 
saw property rights as deriving from the Crown. 53 The Treaty itself was 
characterized as 'a simple nullity'. 54 
B Judicial Recognition of Aboriginal Title 
In New Zealand the common law doctrine of aboriginal title was first 
judicially recognized in R v Symonds. In terms of the effect the Crown's assumption 
of sovereignty had on Maori property rights, Chapman J held that: 
Whatever may be the opinion of jurists as to the strength or weakness of the Native 
title, whatsoever may have been the past vague notions of the Natives of this country, 
whatever may be their present clearer and still growing conception of their own 
dominion over land, it cannot be too solemnly asserted that [ native title] is entitled to 
be respected, that it cannot be extinguished ( at least in times of peace) otherwise than 
by the free consent of the Native occupiers. But for their protection, and for the sake 
of humanity, the Government is bound to maintain, and the Courts to assert, the 
Queen's exclusive right to extinguish it. 55 
50 Jacinta Ruru, "Maori Customary Title Confirmed in Treaty" 
<http://www.arena.org.nz/sblawpro.htrn> (last accessed 22 September 2003). 
51 Ruru, above. 
52 R vSymonds (1847) [1840-1932] NZPCC 387 (SC), 390. 
53 PG McHugh "Aboriginal servitudes and the Land Transfer Act 1952" (1986) 16 VUWLR 313, 319. 
54 Wi Para ta v The Bishop of Wellington (1877) 3 NZ Jur (NS) SC 72, 78. 
55 R v Symonds, above, 390. 
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This recognition of the legal right of Maori to their lands accorded with the 
colonial practice and legislation, including that passed by the Imperial Parliament. 56 
R v Symonds remained the approach of New Zealand courts57 until Wi Parata 1877. 
C Wi Para ta v The Bishop of Wellington 
On of the most influential decisions in New Zealand's legal history, in terms of 
the effect it had on the constitutional status of Maori and their aboriginal rights, is Wi 
Parata v The Bishop of Wellington. It is on aspects of dubious reasoning from this 
case on which In Re Ninety Mile Beach and indeed the High Court decision of Ngati 
Apa were based. 
Wi Parata rejected the approach taken in R v Symonds, and rather, denied that 
the possibility of judicial recognition of abo1iginal title in New Zealand both in 
regards to the common law and statute. 58 The Chief Justice found that Maori were 
'uncivilized', therefore they lacked sovereignty and any property rights. 59 The 
Treaty, as 'a simple nullity' did not alter the position for Maori. 60 "Transactions with 
the natives for the cession of their title to the Crown are thus to be regarded as acts of 
State and therefore are not examinable by any Court."61 
Having taken this view, it was then open for Prendegast CJ to conclude that as 
there existed no sovereign system in New Zealand, all title was therefore the 
Crown's. McHugh describes such reasoning as a 'fundan1ental misconception' 
56 PG McHugh The Maori Magna Carta: New Zealand law and the Treaty of Waitangi (Oxford 
University Press, Auckland, 1991) 111. For example section 73 of the New Zealand Constitution Act 
provided that it was 'unlawful for any Person other than Her Majesty ... to purchase or in anywise 
acquire or accept from the aboriginal Natives land of or belonging to or used or occupied by them in 
common as Tribes or Communities." 
57 The approach in R v Symonds was reiterated in Re 'The Lundon and Whitaker Claim's Act, J 871 
(1872) 2 NZ (CA) 41. 
58 PG McHugh The Maori Magna Carta: New Zealand law and the Treaty of Waitangi (Oxford 
University Press, Auckland, 1991) 113 . 
59 McHugh, above, 113. 
60 Wi Parata v The Bishop of Wellington (1877) 3 NZ Jur (NS) SC 72, 78. 
61 Wi Parata, above, 79. This, as pointed out by McHugh, contradicts the constitutional principle that 
the Crown cannot claim an Act of state against its own subjects. McHugh, above, 114. 
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conflating sovereignty with ownership or imperium with dominium.
62 The only 
source of title to land recognized by the courts being Crown derived. 
63 
That is, Maori 
lacked legal claim to their traditional lands except where their title had been 
transformed into a Crown derived title through the ative Land Corni.
64 If Maori 
lacked sovereignty they also lacked prope1iy rights when the Crown acquired 
sovereignty. 65 As observed by Brennan Jin Mabo [No 2} "[I]t is only the fallacy of 
equating sovereignty and beneficial ownership of land that gives rise to the notion 
that native title is extinguished by the acquisition of sovereignty. "
66 It is this line of 
reasoning that the Crown continued to argue in subsequent litigation, including In Re 
Ninety Mile Beach, and the High Court decision of Ngati Apa. 
While a full history of cases post the Wi Parata decision cannot be canvassed 
here, it is noted that the approach of New Zealand courts was rejected by the Privy 
Council in Nireaha Tamaki v Baker67 and Wallis v Solicitor General. 68 Despite the 
severe criticisms made by the Privy Council, including the observation that it was 
"rather late in the day" for the argument to be made that there was no Maori 
customary law from which the Courts could "take cognizance",69 Wi Parata 
remained the approach to aboriginal title for over 100 years. 70 
Moreover, that Maori could not bring claims to customary land against the 
Crown becan1e codified in section 84 of the Native Lands Act 1909.71 The legacy of 
Wi Parata remained until Te Weehi was decided in 1987. Williamson J concluded 
that "treatment of its indigenous peoples under English common law had confirmed 
that the local laws and property rights of such peoples in cede or settled colonies 
62 McHugh, above, 115. 
63 McHugh, above, 115. 
64 McHugh, above, 115. 
65 McHugh, 115. 
66 (1992) 175 CLR 1 at 51. 
61 Nireaha Tamaki v Baker (1900-01) [1840-1932] NZPCC 371. 
68 Wallis v Solicitor-General ( 1903) NZPCC 23: 
69 Nireaha Tamaki, above, 382. 
70 See Waipapkura v Hempton (1914) 33 NZLR 1065 (SC), Jn Re Ninety Mile Beach [1963] NZLR 
461 (CA), Jn Re the Bed of the Wanganui River [1962] ZLR 600 (CA). 
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were not set aside by the establislunent of British sovereignty."72 His Honour 
concluded that legislation did not extinguish the common law right to fishery, but 
rather fisheries legislation explicitly excluded customary fisheries. 73 Thus the case 
is significant in its admittance of the common law as a source of the customary 
fisheries right alongside the statutory recognition, in direct contrast to the approach 
of Wi Parata. 74 
D Summary 
The common law doctrine of aboriginal title as recognised in the courts of 
ew Zealand, has gone through a full circle. The early courts displayed a clear 
willingness to follow the precedent established in other colonizing nations. However, 
Wi Parata removed any possibility of enforcing aboriginal rights in New Zealand, 
except via the Native Lands Acts. Later Lands Acts codified the statutory approach 
to aboriginal rights delineated in Wi Parata and it was not until over one hundred 
years later, in the Te Weehi decision, that the common law was once again 
recognised as a source of aboriginal rights in ew Zealand. 
IV MAORI LAND COURT 
Before the establislunent of the ative Land Court, Crown purchases were 
required to extinguish Maori customary title to land and open the way for settlement 
under subsequent Crown grant. Maori land legislation, first enacted in 1862, was 
explicitly established "to encourage the extinction of such proprietary customs and to 
provide for the conversion of such modes of ownership into titles derived from the 
Crown".75 The Native Land Court, a creation of statute,76 was established to achieve 
71 PG McHugh The Maori Magna Carta: New Zealand law and the Treaty of Waitangi (Oxford 
University Press, Auckland, 1991) 120. 
72 Te Weehi v Regional Fisheries Officer [1986] 1 ZLR 682, 687. 
73 McHugh, above, 130. 
74 PG McHugh The Maori Magna Carta: New Zealand law and the Treaty of Waitangi (Oxford 
University Press, Auckland, 1991) 131. 
75 As outlined in the preamble to the ative Lands Act 1865. 
16 
this objective, and thus to extinguish Maori customary title to land and to establish 
Crown a derived tenure. 77 
The Native Land Acts78 confeITed jurisdiction on that court to detennine "who 
according to Native custom" were the 'owners' of the customary land.
79 
The owners 
had to prove that according to Maori tikanga they were the owners of land. If the 
Court was satisfied with the claims, the owners were recorded as the owners in the 
Court's records and were then issued with a Court ce1iificate of title. This certificate 
was then exchanged for a Crown grant in freehold from the Governor. 
80 The tenurial 
substitution only occurred with the issue of a Crown grant or a certificate of title 
under the land transfer system. 81 
The Maori Land Comi today has a significantly different role. The purpose of 
the cUITent version of the Native Land Act, Te Ture Whenua Maori Act 1993
82 
is to 
'promote the retention of that land in the hands of its owners ... and to facilitate the 
occupation, development, and utilization of that land for the benefit of its 
owners .. .' 83 The preamble recognises that 'land is a taonga tuku iho of special 
significance to Maori people'. Like it's predecessors the Maori Land Court has the 
ability to ascertain who according to Maori custom are the 'owners' of Maori 
customary land. 84 
76 The Court, as it is know today, derives from the 1865 Act, as the 1862 Act envisaged an informal 
body. Richard Boast "The Evolution of Maori Land Law 1862-1993" 54, in Richard Boast, Andrew 
Erueti, Doug McPhail, Norman F Smith Maori Land Law (Butterworths, Wellington, 1999). 
77 PG McHugh The Maori Magna Carta: New Zealand law and the Treaty of Waitangi (Oxford 
University Press, Auckland, 1991) 113. The Court has been the subject of considerable academic 
writings and has been described as an 'engine of destruction ' , see David Williams Te Kooti Tango 
Wh enua: Th e Native Land Court 1864-1909 (Huia, Wellington, 1999). 
78 Now known as the Maori Land Court. 
79 Section 21 ative Land Act 1862. 
80 Richard Boast "The Evolution of Maori Land Law 1862-1993" 54, in Richard Boast, Andrew 
Erueti, Doug McPhail, Norman F Smith Maori Land Law (Butterworths, Wellington, 1999). 
8 1 Boast, above. 
82 Also know as the Maori Land Act 1993. 
83 Preamble to Te Ture Whenua Maori Land Act 1993. 
84 Section 132. 
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The general jurisdiction of the Maori Land Court is set out is section 18. In 
particular, the Court has jurisdiction to: 
Determine for the purposes of any proceedings in the Court or for any other purpose 
whether any specified land is or is not Maori customary land or Maori freehold land or 
General land owned by Maori or General land or Crown land. 85 
The question arises whether the 1993 Act sets up anything new in regards to 
Maori customary land. Section 18(1)(h) itself confers the general jurisdiction on the 
Maori Land Court to dete1mine whether an area of land is, amongst other things, 
Maori customary land. This function is a new aspect of the Maori Land Court's 
jurisdiction86 as the early Native Land Court proceedings were focussed on the 
identification of the owners of the customary land, rather than the class of land 
involved. The legal effect of conducting this investigation alone is not clear, however 
the general jurisdiction of section 18(1 )(h) is delineated further in sections 130-141. 
It is these prov1s1ons that outline the specific extent of the Land Court's 
jurisdiction. Section 131 gives the Maori Land Court jurisdiction to determine and 
declare, by a status order, the status of any parcel of land, including Maori customary 
land.87 The Court also has jurisdiction to make a vesting order, in respect of the 
defined parcel of land, in favour of such persons as the Court finds to be entitled. 88 
That land shall then become Maori freehold land. 89 The court therefore has the 
ability to investigate the status of the land without determining the question of 
ownership. The significance of this is that it results in a status order, which may or 
may not a vesting order. Theoretically at least, if any Maori customary land is found 
to exist, such land can retain its Maori customary status under the Act. 
85 Section 18( 1 )(h) Te Ture Whenua Maori Act 1993. 
86 The Maori Affairs Act 1953 s 161 (I) preserved the exclusive jurisdiction of the Maori Land Court 
to investigate customary land. No mention is made in the Act of determining the status of customary 
land. 
87 Section 131. 
88 Section 134(7). 
89 Section 134(2). 
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?\fcHugh argues that the presumption that the transfom1ation of customary title 
to ~faori freehold land completely assimilates all traditional incidents of land tenure 
into the English system is flawed.
9° First it applies a statute based approach. that 
only rights attached to a statutory created customary title can be recognised and 
o\'erlooks the common law doctrine of aboriginal title.
91 Secondly he argues that the 
1\faori Affairs Act 1953 and its predecessors deal ,,·ith customary title rather than 
listing of incidents attaching to that ritle.
92 As such, the transformation of customary 
title to a ~faori freehold title precludes a territorial from being made out howe\'er 
traditional incidents may remain over the land as non-territorial title.
93 
This point has receiYed renev,·ed significance after Xaari Apa. ho,,·eyer the 
debate oYer whether a distinction exists between the common la\\- doctrine of 
aboriginal title and Maori customary land as recognised in Te Ture \\ 11enua _ faori 
Act 1993, remains unresolYed. Counsel in the Appeal case sought to make such a 
distinction. The President, howeYer, questioned whether there was in actual fact 'any 
real distinction' gi,·en that both are directed to interests in land in the nature of 
ownership. 9-i 
V DEFINITIONS OF THE FORESHORE AXD SEABED 
The litigation involves three marine areas, the foreshore. the seabed of internal 
waters9 - and the seabed of territorial sea. In ;-Jew Zealand, the foreshore
96 is that part 
of the territory that lies between high-water mark and low-water mark. Specifically 
at common law, the foreshore's landward limit is the high-water mark of ordinary 
tides, which being the line of the medium tide between the spring and the neap tides 
90 PG }.fcHugh "Aboriginal ser\'irudes and the Land Transfer A r 19-2"' (19 6) 16 \ iWLR 313. 323. 
91 :-.fcHugh, abo\'e, 323. 
92 :-.fcHugh. abo\'e, 323. 
93 McHugh, abm·e, 324. 
q
4 Xgari Apa "Ar10mey-General ( 19 June 2003) Coun of Appeal CA 1 3 0 L - - 02, para 103. 
95 Internal ,,·aters are starurorily defined to mclude areas of the sea land,\·ard of the baseline of the 
territorial sea. Section 4 Territorial ea. Connguou Zone. and ExclusiYe Economi Zone Act 19 . 
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g the year. The foreshore is a ani ular issue in_ ·ew Zealand law is due to the 
s e on o law - a lied. s emen ed and supplan ed by statute 
in ~ew Zealand. -
The sea ed i self is gen rally know as the soil and subsoil underneath the sea. 
The :ea e an rela:e ,,·a·ers in l d - oth the inland ,,·aters. inside harbours and 
a_·-. an be,·ond - e lo\\· wa er mar · tretching to the 12 nautical 
:he -oil in :he ex 1 -iye economi zone 99. and in the con inen al 
shel.::- ,·here i ex e d- e ·ond _00 na i al mi e-. :::J 
The areas m es 10n rn he . ·a :i Apa Ii iga ion concern the foreshore and 
se - denned aboYe. Ti le o :hese ar - of land is not o be confused ,,ith the 
Q een·s Chain and th qui e -epara e i- ue of a es·ing the_ -ew Zealand coas line. 
of :he sco e of thi paper o examine ± Q en· s Chain. bu i i- men ioned 
-im. 1_ · o bi~ igh :he separa e ues ion- erng - ·ed in the foreshore and seabed 
de e. 
T 1 THE FORESHORE, 
A The Common Law 
The ommon law pre·ump ion i- tha the foreshore and seab d. by preroga iYe 
no a: o on la Y . is Y - ed in the Cro ,n. : ~I The Hou·e of Lords in A orney-
General · Emerso onfi.nn d thi- general pre·ump ion: · -~ 
~ ... 1:e :-oreshore. seasbo:-e. or sea e:acb are genera y regarded as · e same iliin .:: ee Go, emn1enz o.l 
:~;e S:a:e ~--Per.ang i Beng Hong Oon ·. 9- - : AC.! _.:: . .! 3- . 
- At:on:ey-Ge,:er ! . F:r.d.'a_, ::9.9]. ·zLR .::13 . 
• , RP Bo"- --Toe Foresno~e·· 1: a1:.angi T:-10 l R.an=ahaua .Yb.2n e!"::es. ,\' elhn= on. 1996) 1.1. l. 
;,; The EEZ r1.1::S i:ro::r:: _ ·o ~00 n2 "~:a .. :r..1 .. e- :Tom t.b.e :o,;v de IIET
1
'" 
1 R Hon Helen Oar£. P~e . tini-·er Foreshore ar.d Seabed: Pro;ec;mg Public Access and 
C'.15:on:ar; R:gh:s Consu:: :ion Paper ( ,,- e = on. _003 . 6. 
1 1 R(I'.en, J:e 1:e ::9_0_ GLR 6 . A::orr.e:. -Ge11era.' l Emerson: 9 J .-\.C '9. 6.::3. 
1
: A::orne:,-Genera!. Emerson:: 9:_ .-\C '6. 65:. 
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It is beyond dispute that the Crown is prima facie entitled to every pa1t of the 
foreshore between high and low water mark, and that a subject can only establish a 
title to any given part of the foreshore, either by proving an express grant thereof from 
the Crown, or by giving evidence from which such grant, though not capable of being 
produced will be presumed. 
While the presumptive title can be displaced by proof of an express Crown 
grant103 or continuous occupation, 104 the presumption itself is in contrast to the 
presumption of ordinary land, where the present possessor is presumed to have 
lawful title unless proved otherwise. 105 It was on this presumption that the Crown 
argued that it owned the foreshore and seabed, and upon which it approached the 
continued challenge by Maori to these areas. The Crown continually asserted that 
acquisition of sovereignty imported English common law and vested the foreshore in 
the Crown. 106 Indeed the evidence of this belief is to be found in the various statutes 
enactments that assume that the Crown owned the foreshore. 
107 
B Native Land Court 
Early Tative Land Courts were not adverse to at least the notion of granting 
title to the foreshore. In Maori custom the foreshore and the coast was 'owned' in a 
similar manner as the land. 108 Ownership of the foreshore by a particular descent 
group was to be proved as a matter of fact, by evidence of exclusivity, actual use, 
and management by customary law. 109 Fenton CJ in Whakaharatau viewed the issue 
of ownership of the foreshore as simply a question of fact. 110 
103 These grants are taken subject to the public right of navigation and anchorage Attorney-General v 
Emerson, above, 653. 
104 Attorney-General v Emerson, above. 
105 RP Boast "The Foreshore" (Waitangi Tribunal Rangahaua Whanui Series, Wellington, 1996), 23. 
106 Jn Re Ninety Mile Beach [1963] NZLR 461,463 (CA). 
107 See the Foreshore And Seabed Endown1ent Revesting Act 1991, the Resource Management Act 
1991. 
108 Alan Ward ' ational Overview" (Waitangi Tribunal Rangahaua Whanui series, GP Publications, 
Wellington, 1997), vol 2, 337 <http://www.knowledge-
basket.co.nz/oldwaitangi/natview/vol2/v2prelim.PDF> (last accessed 30 August 2003). 
109 Ward, above, 338. 
"
0 Whakaharatau Hauraki 4 MB 202 in Kauwaeranga Judgment (1 870) 4 Hauraki MB 236; reprinted 
in (1984) VUWLR 227 footnote 3. 
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While the claimant's case was dismissed, it was only due to a lack of 
evidence proving ownership. The Kauwaeranga Judgment
11 1, which was decided 
just weeks after Whakaharatau, likewise considered ownership of the foreshore. The 
Court proceeded on the basis that the Native Land Court had jurisdiction to consider 
and decide on the matter as it saw fit. However Fenton CJ refused to issue a 
certificate of title recognising 'an absolute freehold interest in the soil' due to "evil 
consequences which might ensue" if the Court issued exclusive title to Maori. 
112 
C Crown Reaction 
Boast suggest that the Crown considered, up until mid-1870 at the latest, the 
Crown did not consider that it owned the foreshore until the land contiguous to the 
foreshore was extinguished. 113 In 1878 the Crown enacted section 14 7 of the 
Harbours Act 114 was enacted. Section 147 provided: 
No part of the shore of the sea, or of any creek, bay, arm of the sea, or navigable 
river communicating therewith, where and so far up as the tide flows and re-
flows, nor any land under the sea or under any navigable river, except as may 
already have been authorized by or under any Act or Ordinance, shall be leased, 
conveyed, granted, or disposed of to an Harbour Board, or any other body 
(whether incorporated or not), or to any person or persons, without the special 
sanction of an Act of the General Assembly. 
The provision states the Crown's view that only itself could make grants to 
the foreshore "except as may already have been authorized by or under any Act or 
Ordinance". However, the language of the provision is clearly forward looking, 
prohibiting future grants by any body other than by a legislative Act. Even before the 
111 Kauwaeranga Judgment (1870) 4 Hauraki MB 236; reprinted in (1984) VUWLR 227. 
112 Kauwaeranga Judgment, above, 244. 
113 RP Boast "The Foreshore" (Waitangi Tribunal Rangahaua Whanui Series, Wellington, 1996) 13.4. 
114 Replaced by sl50 Harbours Act 1950, repealed by s362 Resource Management Act 1991. 
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Ngati Apa discussion on this provision, it was doubtful that this provision would 
satisfy modem extinguishment tests.
115 
Nor did the Act clarify the Land Court's jurisdiction over the foreshore.
116 
As 
outlined above, title by the ative Land Court was different from the grant by the 
Crown. While the Harbours Act did not allow the Crown to grant an area of 
foreshore, this did not prevent the ative Land Court from carrying out an 
investigation of title in the Court and the subsequent issue of a title from the 
Court. 11 7 By 1909 the legislature had moved to prohibit customary rights from being 
enforced in any forum bar the Native Land Court. "[S]ave so far as otherwise 
expressly provided in any other Act" Maori were limited to enforcing their 
customary title through the Native Land Court.
118 The next significant event for 
Maori claims to the foreshore came in 1962 in In Re Ninety Mile Beach. 
D Re Ninety Mile Beach 
Notably, in 1962 the Court of Appeal was faced with the exact issue in regards 
to the foreshore as the High Court and Court of Appeal in the Ngati Apa litigation. In 
both cases the central issue concerned whether the Maori Land Court had jurisdiction 
to investigate title and issue freehold orders to the foreshore. The findings of Ninety 
Mile Beach have been severely criticised by the Court of Appeal in Ngati Apa and 
such failings will be examined in Part XII. The purpose of this section is to underline 
the conclusions of Ninety Mile Beach and the resulting effect of the decision on 
Maori claims to the foreshore. 
It was argued by the Solicitor-General, that on the assumption of sovereignty 
the foreshore became vested in the Crown. That by the common law the foreshore 
115 RP Boast "The Foreshore" (Waitangi Tribunal Rangahaua Whanui Series, Wellington, 1996) 13.4. 
116 Richard Boast "In Re Ninety Mile Beach Revisited" (1993) 23 VUWLR 145, 153. 
117 Richard Boast "In Re Ninety Mile Beach Revisited" (1993) 23 VUWLR 145, 153. 
11 8 These provisions were re-enacted by sections 155-158 of the Maori Affairs Act which provide that 
Maori customary title is unenforceable against the Crown. While this provision has been repealed by 
23 
wa Yested in the Cro\\·n.119 This principle became applicable to ew Zealand as part 
of the common law relating to title to land. 120 The Maori Land Court never had 
jurisdiction to inYestigate land below the high \Yater mark as the Crown prima face is 
entitled to the foreshore, thus limiting the jurisdiction of that Court.
121 
The Court of Appeal was unconYinced by this argument. In orth J's opinion 
the better ,·iew \\'as that in early times the jurisdiction of the Maori Land Court was 
not limited to land abo,·e the high water mark.::~ It \\·as accepted as obYious that 
:-.1aori prior to 1 40 regarded the foreshore as part of the lands over which they 
exercised dominion. 123 The Cro\\·n's assertions that natiYe title over the foreshore 
,,·as extinguished by the Cro,Yn by operation of the common law were described by 
Gresson J s as inYolving a 'serious infringement of the spirit of the Treaty of 
\\' aitangi' and would amount to depriYing ::.1aori of their customary rights to the 
foreshore ·by a side wind. u 
The Court of Appeal found that Y!aori could only enforce their aboriginal 
rights against the Cro,,n through a statute that recognised such rights.
12
.: In );"orth J's 
,·iew ·· ... the rights of Yiaori to their tribal lands depended wholly on the grace and 
fa,·our of Her ::.1ajesty Queen ictoria ... " 126 In reaching this conclusion both );forth J 
and I.A. Gresson J applied feudal principles 12 evident in the rea oning of Wi 
Parara. );"onh J proceeded to find that statute law burdened the Cro,,n's paramount 
title to land \\·ithin ?\ew Zealand. 12 This gave the Y!aori Land Court jurisdiction to 
Te Ture \\nenua \faori, se tion 6 of the Limitation Act 1950 now provides that any such claims have 
to be brought before the court wnhin 12 years of the offending act. 
119 Citing Auomey-General v Emerson, Simon and Wintringham [ I 91] AC 649, 6 -3. 
12° CitingR ,· Joyce(l906) 25. "ZLR - . 9, Waipapakura vHempron (1914) 33 :\'ZLR 106-, 1071. 
121 Jn Re. 'inef) Jfile Beach [1963] ~ZLR 461, 46 . 
122 In Re. ·inen .\.file Beach. abo\·e. 46 . 
123 A fact whi;h the appella~t \1aori tribes had demonstrated in relation to the foreshore of:\'inety 
\hie Bea h and were thus deemed by the Court as haYing O\rned and occupied according to their 
customs Jn Re. ·111ef) .\file Beach, abo\·e, 467. 
12
' In Re . "inen .\,file Beach. above. r -4 . 
125 PG \1cHugh The .\faori .\1agna Carta: . 'eii Zealand la\\ and 1he Treaf) of IVaitangz (Oxford 
Cni\·ersity Press. Auckland. 1991) 125. 
126 Jn Re .\'inef) ,\hie Beach. above. 46 
12
; . kHugh. above. I r. 
1.2& • 1 Hugh. aboYe. 12 
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investigate and issue title down to the low-water mark. However, that jurisdiction 
was now necessarily limited. According to the Court, once an application for 
investigation of title for land adjoining the sea had been detennined, the customary 
rights to land below the high water mark were extinguished. If the Court fixed the 
boundary at the high water mark, then ownership of the land in between the high 
water mark and low water mark 'remained' with the Crown, freed from its 
obligations undertaken by legislation. 129 
If the ocean was described the boundary of land, by virtue of section 12 of the 
Crown Grants Act 1866, the foreshore likewise 'remained' with the Crown. 1
30 That 
is the Crown Grant operated to restrict seaward boundary of the land. In Gresson J' s 
view it would be inconsistent with the terms of the grant to argue that land below the 
high water mark could be subject of a later freehold order. 13 1 
In terms of the effect of section 150 of the Harboms Act 1950 both JJ North 
and Gresson were of the view that it was the intention of the Legislatme to ensure 
that the foreshore was not to be disposed of otherwise than by a special Act of 
Parliament. 132 While North J f01mulated the limitation of the Maori Land Court 
jmisdiction independently of section 150, Gresson J belief was that the provision 
acted as a fetter on the jurisdiction of the Maori Land Court. 133 'I am satisfied it was 
no longer competent for the Maori Land Court to investigate title to or issue any 
freehold order in respect of the foreshore in face of the prohibition contained in this 
section.' This stance received much attention in Ngati Apa. 
The immediate effect of Ninety Mile Beach was to preclude claims to the Maori 
Land Court for investigation of the foreshore where the adjoining land was no longer 
129 Jn Re Ninety Mile Beach, above, 473. 
130 In Re Ninety Mile Beach, above, 473. 
131 In Re Ninety Mile Beach, above, 479. 
132 In Re Ninety Mile Beach, above, 474. 
133 ' I am satisfied it was no longer competent for the Maori Land Court to investigate title to or issue 
any freehold order in respect of the foreshore in face of the prohibition contained in this section.' In 
Re Ninety Mile Beach, above, 480. 
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Maori customary land. Thus in Green v Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries1 34 it 
was held that as the right claimed was an exclusive right to the tribe, derived and 
based from a proprietary tribal claim to the foreshore, any exclusive fishing right, 
based on ownership of the foreshore, was extinguished. 135 Ninety Mile Beach, while 
based on dubious reasoning itself, was the basis of the High Court decision of Ngati 
Apa. 
E Further Statutory Enactments 
Today, the Crown's claim to title to the foreshore continues to be generally 
on the common law. Section 150 of the Harbours Act 1950 was repealed by section 
362 of the Resource Management Act 1991. However in the same year the Foreshore 
and Seabed Endowment Revesting Act 1991 was enacted to re-vest in the Crown 
certain areas of the foreshore and seabed previously alienated to harbour boards and 
local authorities. 136 Surprisingly, nowhere in the 1991 Act did the statute contain a 
restriction on alienation of the foreshore and seabed. Section 9A was enacted in 1994 
to overcome that deficiency. 
Foreshore and seabed to be land of the Crown - (1) The principal Act is hereby 
amended by inserting, after section 9, the following section: 
'9A. (1) All land that -
(a) Either -
1. Is foreshore and seabed within the coastal marine area (within the 
meaning of the Resource Management Act 1991); or 
11. Was foreshore, seabed, or both, within the coastal marine area 
(within the meaning of that Act) on the 1'1 day of October 1991 and has been 
reclaimed (whether lawfully or otherwise) on or after that date; and 
(2) All land of the Crown to which this section applies shall be held by the Crown in 
perpetuity and shall not be sold or otherwise disposed of except-
(a) Pursuant to the Resource Management Act 1991 ; or 
(b) By the authority of a special Act of Parliament; or 
134 Green v Minishy of Agriculture and Fisheries High Comt, Wanganui [1990] 1 NZLR 411. 
135Green, above, 414. 
136 The long title the Foreshore and Seabed Endowment Revesting Act 1991. 
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(c) By a transfer to the Crown, where the land will not be land to which the 
Land Act 1948 applies ... . 
The Amendment Act provided: 
Section 2 ... 
(2) Notwithstanding anything in section 9A of the principal Act (as inserted by 
subsection (1) of this section), in relation to any land of the Crown to which that 
section applies, nothing in that section shall limit or affect -
(a) Any agreement to sell, lease, licence, or otherwise dispose of that land 
that was entered into before the date of commencement of that section, 
where the disposal has not been completed before that date; or 
(b) Any interest in that land held by any person other than the Crown. 
Section 5 of the 1991 Act re-vested many areas of the foreshore that the 
Crown had. This re-vesting took effect as if the land "had never been alienated from 
the Crown ... " 137 the common law position being restored in respect of those areas.
138 
The significance being that the Crown's title to the foreshore remains encumbered by 
Maori customary rights where those rights are shown to exist.
139 Notably nowhere in 
the Resource Management Act 1991 is title vested in the Crown. Rather the purpose 
of this act is management of natural and physical resources. 
VII THE SEABED 
The Crown's title to the bed of internal waters arose when Britain acquired 
territorial sovereignty. 140 The source of Crown's title to the territorial seabed is not 
clear. 141 The source may stem from a common law rule imported into New Zealand, 
of it may stem from a rule of international law given effect in domestic Jaw. 142 The 
137 Section 5(b) Foreshore and Seabed Endown1ent Revesting Act 1991. 
138 FM Brookfield "The Waitangi Tribunal and the Whanganui River-Bed" (2000) NZLR 1, footnote 
11. 
139 Brookfield, above. 
140 PG. McHugh "The Legal status of Maori Fishing Rights in Tidal Waters" (1984) 14 VUWLR 247, 
249. 
141 McHugh, above. 
142 McHugh, above. 
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Cro,,11, by the common la, had always claimed the sovereign jurisdiction over the 
seabed for 3 miles. 
Whatever the source, the Crown's title was confirmed in legislation. 
Following the Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone 1958, section 
i..;3 of the Territorial Sea and Fishing Zone Act 1965 clarified the Crown's title to 
the both internal waters and the territorial sea. Section 7 is the statutory vesting 
provision, which provides, subject to the grant of an estate or interest made, the 
seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas bounded on the landward side by low-
water mark and on the seaward side by the outer limits of the territorial sea are 
deemed to be, and always to have been, so vested. Remarks noted in Attorney-
General ex ref Hutt River Board v Leighton 144 are relevant when analysing this 
prov1s10n. 
The operative words are "shall remain and shall be deemed to have been always 
vested in the Crown." These are not words purporting to vest or divest anything. The 
words "shall remain" look to the future, and the other words look back to the past, and 
there are no words operati\·e in praesenti such as one would expect to find if the 
purpose were to diYest interests already alienated from the Crown and to revest them 
in the Cro\\'ll. This is the sort of thing one expects in a declaratory enactment. .. 
145 
The vesting provision is arguably declaratory of the common law, as to the 
seabed of three-mile territorial sea. This Act was replaced by the Territorial Sea, 
Contiguous Zone and Exclusive Economic Zone Act 1977, which retained the above 
section, but substituted the three-mile territorial sea by 12 miles in 1978, extending 
143 7. Bed of territorial sea and internal waters vested in the Crown - Subject to the grant of any 
estate or interest therein (whether by or pursuant to the provisions of any enactment or otherwise, and 
whether made before or after the commencement of this act), the seabed and subsoil of the submarine 
areas bounded on the landward side by the low-water mark along the coast of~ew Zealand, including 
the coast of all islands, and on the seaward side by the outer limits of the territorial sea of ew 
Zealand shall be deemed to be and always to have been vested in the Cro\\TI 
144 Attorney-General ex re!. Hurt River Board v Leighton [195-] );ZLR ro, 7 9. 
145 Although these remarks were made in reference to section 261 of the Coal :.1ines Act 1979 AG ex 
re. Hutt River Board , above, 7 9. 
28 
the area of vested seabed beyond the three-mile common law limit and as such, 
cannot be regarded as declaratory. 146 
The sovereignty of the Crown over New Zealand's tenitorial sea
147 is qualified 
by the customary international right of innocent passage enjoyed by foreign vessels 
through the ten-itorial sea. 148 The public has ce1iain rights in respect of the territorial 
sea and internal waters. These common law rights include the public right of 
navigation and the right to anchor. 149 How such rights would interact with a 
customary title of some kind is an issue that is unanswered in New Zealand, and is 
likely to remain that way in light of the government's foreshore and seabed proposal. 
In Australia this point has received judicial attention, with the general view being 
that international rights enjoy a higher status than aboriginal or native title rights.
150 
Notably, the claim to customary title made in the seabed made in the 
Marlborough Sounds litigation is not unheralded in the Maori Land Court. In 1955, 
Nga Puhi elders sought to title to the Pacific Ocean in the Maori Land Court. The 
Maori Land Court declined jurisdiction on the issue. As a creature of statute, the 
Court reasoned, it was necessarily limited by the powers conferred to it by 
statute. 151 Its power in relation to the sea and tidal waters were limited to disputes 
concerning Maori fisheries. 152 
A Summary 
146 The Laws of New Zealand (Butterworths, Wellington, 2002) Water, part 1(1), para 10. 
14 7 In terms of the Exclusive Economic Zone (seaward of the territorial sea to 200 Nautical Miles), 
New Zealand has a limited jurisdiction than sovereignty. The same applies to the Continental Shelf. 
148 See the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Montego Bay, Jamaica, 10 December 
1982; UN DOC NCONF 62/122 and Corr 1-11), Arts 17-19. 
149 Attorney-General for British Columbia v Attorney-General for Canada [1914] AC 153, 169 (PC). 
15° Commonwealth v Yarmirr; Yarmirr v Northern Territory [2001] HCA 56. 
151 Te Moananui a Kiwa , 26 Hokianga MB 306, 310. 
152 Te Moananui a Kiwa , 26 Holcianga MB 306, 310. 
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The above sections have been an attempt to give historical context to the 
current foreshore and seabed litigation, both in terms of judicial decisions, and also 
legislative Acts. What has been seen is that while initially the Native Land Court 
was receptive to foreshore claims at least, this practice soon desisted, particularly 
after Ninety-Mile Beach. The government obviously concerned to assert its claim to 
the foreshore and seabed passed various enactments in an attempt to clarify the 
point. However, such provisions have since proved to be insufficient, as will be 
discussed below. 
VIII RE MARLBOROUGH SOUNDS FORESHORE AND SEABED 
In 1997 Ngati Apa, Ngati Koata, Ngati Kuia, Ngati Rarua, Ngati Tama, Ngati 
Toa and Rangitane, commenced proceedings in the Maori Land Court for declaratory 
orders that the foreshore and seabed in the Marlborough Sounds is Maori customary 
land. If successful, the claimants were to seek an investigation of title to the land. 153 
If the Maori Land Court were to find that the land was not Maori customary land, but 
Crown land, the iwi sought a declaration that the land was held by the Crown in a 
fiduciary capacity for their benefit under section 18(1 )(i) of Te Ture Whenua Maori 
Act. 
In the Maori Land Court, Hingston J was faced with the question of whether 
smce 1840, Maori customary rights to the foreshore and seabed in and around the 
Marlborough Sounds had been extinguished. It was assumed that historically Maori 
customary rights existed over the seabed and foreshore. 154 Hingston J distinguished 
Ninety Mile Beach on the basis that that case preceded on the assumption that the 
land in question had been investigated by the Native Land Court155, which was 
unlike the lands of the Marlborough Sounds which had been purchased before the 
153 Under section 132 of Te Ture Whenua Maori Act 1993. 
154 Jn Re the Marlborough Sounds foreshore and seabed 22A Nelson MB 1 22 December 1997 161. 
155 Jn Re Marlborough Sounds, above, 164. Despite the finding of the Court of Appeal being false in 
regards to the pariicular history of Ninety Mile beach. See Richard Boast "In Re inety Mile Beach 
Revisited" (1993) 23 VUWLR 145. 
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Land Court came into being. 156 As such, the customary rights in the foreshore not 
included in the sales of land adjacent in the Marlborough Sounds or extinguished by 
A · d · · 157 an et, remame m existence. 
In regards to the seabed, after referring to the extinguishment test espoused in 
Faulkn er, the Judge stated that section 7 of the Tenitorial Sea and Exclusive 
Economic Zone 1977 went no finiher than statutorily assume sovereignty over the 
seabed. As such the provision did not extinguish Maori customary rights in the 
seabed. This decision was appealed to the Maori Appellate Court, where that Court 
agreed to state a case to the High Court. 
IX ATTORNEY-GENERAL V NGATI APA (HIGH COURT) 
Unlike the Land Court, the central issue faced by the High Court and the 
Court of Appeal, was the initial question, as a point of law, of whether the Maori 
Land Court could entertain the substantive enquiry of whether customary land exists 
in fact in the foreshore and seabed. In the High Court, Ellis J answered this question 
in the negative. 
The High Court found that the Maori Land Court had jurisdiction to 
investigate Maori customary land158, but included land to the low water mark only. 
As such, the Maori Land Court did not have jurisdiction over land below the low 
water mark. 159 However, following Ninety Mile Beach, if the land above the high 
water mark was no longer Maori customary land, any Maori customary title to the 
foreshore was extinguished.160 Accordingly, the jurisdiction of the Maori Land Court 
was effectively non-existent. 
156 In Re Marlborough Sounds, above, 164. 
157 In Re Marlborough Sounds, above, 164. 
158 Attorney-General v Ngati Apa 22 June 2001 HC Wellington AP 152/2000, 7. 
159 Ngati Apa, above, 13 . 
160 Ngati Apa, above, 32. 
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While Ellis J does not directly address the doctrine of aboriginal title, the 
legacy of Wi Parata remained evident in background comments made by the Justice. 
The Justice found: 
. .. it attractive to hold that upon cession of sovereignty to the Crown, the Crown then 
held the land as against her subjects including Maori with "full and absolute 
dominium" including the fee . The Crown 's Treaty obligations were then for the 
Crown to honour by transferring the fee to Maori in respect of customary land, where 
they could show rights more or less equivalent to their right to exclusive possession, 
an essential aspect of fee simple. 161 
That is in Ellis J's view, on the assumption of sovereignty the Crown 
acquired full beneficial ownership of ew Zealand also. As noted above, the Crown 
acquires its radical title over the land, however this title is burdened by the 
customary title of Maori. It is only once this title is lawfully extinguished that the 
radical title expands to full beneficial ownership of land. 162 The existence and 
recognition of pre-existing property rights did not depend on statutory 
acknowledgment, but remained in existence until lawfully extinguished. 
Further there was never a requirement that Maori claimants had to prove 
exclusive possession to be granted a freehold title. The ative Land Court was 
empowered to decide who according to tikanga Maori were the rightful owners, 
rather than whether the customary rights amounted to exclusive possession, a feature 
of fee simple title. Erueti labels this approach as 'plainly ethnocentric" 163 
161 Ngati Apa, above, 27 . 
162 Andrew Erueti "Native Title Claims to Sea Country" [2001] NZLJ 415, 417. 
163 Erueti, above, 41 7. 
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X NGATI APA V ATTORNEY GENERAL (COURT OF APPEAL): 
GENERAL COMMENTS 
A Approach oftlte Courts 
The approach taken in the Maori Land Court and the Court of Appeal are in 
stark contrast to the approach of the High Court. Hingston J, while faced with a 
different question, emphasises the continuity of pre-existing property rights, which 
were assumed to be in existence until lawfully extinguished. In contrast Ellis J's 
analysis is focused on unmodified English common law, and as a consequence is not 
receptive to the notion of recognition of customary prope1iy rights. Like the Maori 
Land Court, the Court of Appeal, spends considerable time detailing the doctrine of 
aboriginal title and the fact that the conunon law in New Zealand was modified by 
local circumstances. It is fundamentally on this basis on which the Court of Appeal 
proceeds. 
XI NGATI APA V ATTORNEY GENERAL (COURT OF APPEAL): 
DECISION 
On June 19 2003 the Court of Appeal issued its opinion from the appeal of 
Ellis J's decision. The Comi of Appeal was at pains to stress that it was only dealing 
with the narrow issue of the extent of the Maori Land Court's jurisdiction. "The 
outcome of the appeal cannot establish that there is Maori customary land below the 
high water mark."164 Moreover any such claims would face "a number of hurdles in 
fact and law." 165 In the proceedings before it, however, the onus was on the 
respondents to prove that the Maori Land Court did not have the appropriate 
jurisdiction. The standard being, as Elias CJ states, "only if it is clear without any 
164 Ngati Apa v Attorney General (19 June 2003) Court of Appeal CA 173/01, 75/02, para 8. 
165 Ngati Apa, above, para 8. 
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evidence being necessary that the appellants cannot succeed as a matter of law that 
this can be prevented from proceeding to a hearing. 166 
A Maori Land Court's Jurisdiction 
The Court was unarumous m its view that the Ma.oii Land Court has 
jurisdiction to consider whether the foreshore and seabed were Maori customary 
land. The Court preceded to made substantial criticisms of Ellis J's findings stating 
that the High Court was in error, both in beginning it's analysis with the English 
common law unmodified by ew Zealand's conditions and assuming Crown 
acquired dominium on acquisition of sovereignty. 167 The Court made a number of 
observations in regards to sovereignty acquisition. 
1 English common law 
The starting point of the Court's reasorung 1s that, in British colonies, the 
introduced common law adapted to reflect local conditions, including the pre-
existing property rights. 168 New Zealand was no different. As of 1840 the laws of 
England as existed January 14 1840, were to be enforce in New Zealand only "so far 
as applicable to the circumstances thereof." 169 This approach was affirmed by the 
English Laws Act 1858. As Sir Kenneth Roberts-Wray notes "[a] Court may 
therefore hold, in the light of the circumstances, that an English law is to be entirely 
rejected ... " as this Court of Appeal in fact did. 170 
Any prerogative of the Crown as to property in foreshore and seabed as a matter of 
English common law in 1840 cannot apply in ew Zealand if displaced by local 
circumstances. Maori custom and usage recognising property in foreshore and seabed 
lands displaces any English Crown Prerogative and is effective as a matter of ew 
Zealand law, unless such property interests have been lawfully extinguished. The 
166 Ngati Apa, above, para 12. 
167 Ngati Apa, above, para 13. 
168 Ngati Apa, above, para,17. 
169 Ngati Apa, above, para 17. 
170 Sir Kenneth Roberts-Wray Commonwealth and Colonial law (Stevens, London 1966), 626. 
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existence and extent of any such customary property interest is determined in 
application of tikanga. That is a matter for the Maori Land Court to consider on 
application to it or on reference by the High Court. 
171 
In taking this approach the Court of Appeal sweeps aside the respondents 
assertions 172 that the conm1on law 173 provides that the Crown is by prerogative right, 
the presumptive owner of the seabed, foreshore, the beds of tidal rivers, and coastal 
waters in ew Zealand. 174 Whether the Crown has prope1iy in the foreshore and 
seabed is dependent on the pre-existing property interests, determined according to 
tikanga, in the foreshore of Maori. Only when such interests are lawfully 
extinguished does the Crown take beneficial ownership of those areas. Whether 
those interests have been lawfully extinguished is to be determined by the Maori 
Land Court. 
2 Foreshore and seabed - different from land 
The respondents agreed that the Crown had no property in ordinary land 
(above mean high water mark) until lawfully extinguished, but argued this was not 
true of the foreshore and seabed. This difference, it was argued, is a result of the 
common law, statutory vesting of such lands in the Crown, and the meaning of 
'land' in Te Ture Whenua Maori was not inclusive of such areas. These asse1iions 
will now be looked at in tum. 
(a) The common law 
The Attorney General asserted that "the legal assumption of an original native 
title over the surface of New Zealand had always ended where the land ends and the 
171 Ngati Apa, above, para 49. 
172 Throughout ew Zealand's legal history regarding ownership, the main argument of the Crown 
has been that the general principle at common law is, that the Crown is by prerogative right the 
presumptive owner of the foreshore, seabed, the beds of tidal rivers, and coastal waters. R Boast The 
Foreshore, (Waitangi Tribunal Rangahaua Whanui Series, Wellington, 1996), 22. 
173 This presumptive title can be displaced by proof of a Crown grant or continuous occupation. 
174 Boast, above. 
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sea begins" but limited this argument to the seabed. 175 This presumption is sourced 
in the common law, inherent because of the different qualities of the foreshore and 
seabed from land and because of the public rights in navigation and recreation, 
which it was argued, makes "private property interests somehow unthinkable." 176 
In response, the Court noted that interests in soil below low water mark were 
not unknown to the laws of England, including interests arising by custom and usage. 
In fact, many interests were created by the Crown177, as demonstrated by the titles in 
Port Marlborough. 178 Therefore there could be tenable argument that at least some 
seabed could be constitutive of land under section 129. The proper starting point is 
with the facts as to native property, rather than assumptions of the nature of 
property. 179 
(b) Meaning of 'land' 
The Court of Appeal was unammous 111 concluding that the seabed and 
foreshore is "land" for the purposes for section 129( 1) of Te Ture Whenua Maori Act 
1993. The Chief Justice argued that dictionary definitions were not conclusive, but 
noted that many definitions where consistent with the foreshore and seabed being 
"land", for example, "the solid portion of the earths surface". 180 In addition as a 
matter of language, the Chief Justice was unable to distinguish between seabeds, 
lakebeds or riverbeds, the latter two both being the subject of rulings by the Maori 
Land Court. 181 
In some respects the finding that land as used in Te Ture Whenua Maori 
includes the foreshore and seabed runs counter to other statutory enactments. 'Land' 
is defined in section 4 of Te Ture Whenua Maori Act as "including Maori land, 
175 Ngati Apa, above, para 50. 
176 Ngati Apa, above, para 50. 
177 Ngati Apa, above, para 5 I. 
178 Ngati Apa, above, para 110. 
179 Ngati Apa, above, para 54 
180 Ngati Apa, above, para 55. 
181 Ngati Apa, above, para 55. 
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General land and Crown land." Compare this the Crown Minerals Act 1991 where 
land is defined as "land covered by water; and also includes the foreshore and seabed 
to the outer limits of the teITitorial sea." 182 However by taking a liberal approach to 
statutory interpretation the Court of Appeal is able to get around the apparent 
inconsistency between statutes. 
In fact, Elias CJ questioned whether the jurisdiction of the Maori Land Cami 
is properly addressed by asking whether Parlian1ent intended to permit recognition in 
the seabed under Te Ture Whenua Maori. The Lands legislation was never 
constitutive of customary property. 183 Keith and Anderson JJ also pick up on this 
point and after reviewing Te Ture Whenua Maori Act the conclude that: 
[g]iven the long history of Maori customary property and rights in areas covered by 
water a much clearer indication would have had to appear in the 1993 Act for it to be a 
measure preventing the Maori Land Court from investigating claims in those areas. 184 
A literal approach did not apply to the Maori Land Court or Te Ture Whenua 
Maori Act. 185 As noted above, as certificates of title had previously been issued for 
land under the sea within the claimed area, it could not be said that at least some 
seabed within the claim area could constitute "land in New Zealand. 186 
3 The doctrine of Aboriginal title and Maori customary land 
The Chief Justice outlines the doctrine of aboriginal title and its treatment in New 
Zealand courts. Elias CJ then makes some poignant conclusions and clarifications in 
regards to the doctrine of aboriginal title and its relationship with the statutory 
recognised Maori customary land: 
182 
Section 2 Crown Minerals Act 1991, Andrew Erueti "Native Title Claims to Sea Country" [2001] 
ZLJ 415,417. 
183 Ngati Apa, above, para 56. 
184 Ngati Apa, above, para 178. 
185 Ngati Apa, above, para 174. 
186 Ngati Apa, above, para 11. 
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ew Zealand legislation has assumed continued existence at common law of 
cu tomary property w1til it is extinguished. It can be extinguished by sale to the 
Crown, through investigation of title through the Land Court and subsequent deemed 
Cro\\11 grant, or by legislation of other lawful authority. The 1aori lands legislation 
wa not constituti\'e of Maori customary land. It assumed its continued existence. 
There is no presumption of Cro,,11 O\rnership as a consequence of the assumption of 
sovereignty to be discerned from the legislation. Such presumption is contrary to the 
conm1on law. Maori customary land is a residual category of property, defined by 
custom ... The Crown has no property interest in customary land and is not the source 
of title to it. 187 
Justice Tipping stated that: 
It is also important to recognise that the concept of title, as used in ilie expression 
Maori customary title, should not necessarily be equated with the concepts and 
incidents of title as knov,rn to the common law of England. The incidents and concepts 
of Maori customary title depend on the customs and usages (tikanga :\1aori) which 
give rise to it. What those customs and usages may be is essentially a question of fact 
for determination by the Maori Land Court. 
Justice Tipping said that title to Maori customary land must be lawfully 
extinguished before it could be viewed as ceasing to exist. 18 The two methods 
available to abrogate such interests were an Act of Parlian1ent or a decision of a 
competent court amending the common law. 189 However, in view of the nature of 
Maori customary title, as underpinned by the Treaty of Waitangi and the Te Ture 
Whenua Maori Act 1993, no court having jurisdiction in New Zealand could 
properly extinguish Maori customary title. 190 Parliament could effect such 
extinguishment, however such intention would need to be "crystal clear," 
demonstrating its purpose by express words or at least by necessary implication. 191 
While Keith and Anderson JJ phrase extinguishment in terms of the necessary 
187 Ngati Apa, above, para 47. 
188 Ngati Apa, above, para 185. 
189 Ngati Apa, above, para 185. 
190 Ngati Apa, above, para 185 
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purpose of the legislation having to be "clear and plain" 192 it is unlikely that any 
difference exists between the two fornrnlations. 
XII EXTINGUISHMENT: FORESHORE 
A In Re the Ninety Mile Beach rejected 
As noted above, Ninety Mile Beach provided a substantial obstacle for the iwi 
trying to assert customary ownership to the foreshore. The Court of Appeal, 
however, made substantial criticisms of the reasoning of the 1963 Court of Appeal. 
Elias CJ, Keith and Anderson JJ, conclude that Ninety Mile Beach was wrong in law 
and should not be followed. Following the principle that the English common law 
applied in ew Zealand so far as the circumstances allowed, the Court is critical of 
the 1963 Comi of Appeals assumption that the English common law displaced Maori 
customary title on acquisition of sovereignty. 193 Turner J in the Supreme Court, 
particularly placed reliance upon English conunon law presumptions relating to 
ownership of the foreshore. The Court is adamant, however, that the common law as 
received in New Zealand was modified by recognised Maori customary property 
interests. "If any such custom is shown to give interests in foreshore and seabed, 
there is no room for a contrary presumption derived from English common law. The 
common law of New Zealand is different." 194 This is a strong hint for future litigants 
concerning any subject matter, to argue for a New Zealand common law, rather than 
a blind obsession with the English common law. 
The Court of Appeal was also critical of the statutory analysis in Ninety Mile 
Beach, in particular the reading given to section 150 of the Harbours Act 1950. As 
noted above, an investigation and detern1ination of a claim to customary land did not 
19 1 Ngati Apa, above, para 185. 
192 Following the authority of R v Sparrow [1990] 1 SCR 1075, 1099, Mabo v Queensland (No 2) 
(1992) 175 CLR 1, 64, 11, 195-196 and Te Runanga O Muriwhenua v Attorney-General [1990] 2 
NZLR 641, 655. 
193 Ngati Apa, above, para 79. 
194 Ngati Apa, above, para 86. 
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itself involve a grant of land as prescribed by section 150. Secondly the provisions 
were forward looking in the restriction of grants to the foreshore. Therefore as a 
result of not following a principle espoused in the decision, that native property 
rights should not be extinguished 'by a side wind', the 1963 Court of Appeal itself 
misread the provision. 195 
The analysis of section 12 of the Crown Grants Act 1866 likewise received 
critical review. According to the 1963 Court of Appeal, by virtue of section 12 of the 
Crown Grants Act 1866 196, investigation and grant of land to the high-water mark 
determined the foreshore to 'remain' in the Crown. Keith and Anderson JJ however 
argue that section 12 was no more than a conveyancing presumption rebuttable by 
the tenns of the grant. The Justices did not see Crown Grants Act as having general 
significance as extinguishment. 197 Such determinations are to be made only on 
interpretation of particular grants. 198 
Elias CJ reasons that an investigation and grant of coastal land cannot 
extinguish any property held under Maori custom in lands below high water mark. 
Whether there are such properties is a matter for the Maori Land Court to investigate 
in the first instance as a question of tikanga. "An approach which precludes 
investigation of the fact of entitlement according to custom because of an assumption 
that custom is displaced by a change in sovereignty or because the sea was used as a 
boundary for individual titles on the shore is wrong in law." 199 
Interestingly, Gault P takes a different view on Ninety-Mile Beach. The 
President limited the finding that a Land Court grant which stated the sea as the 
boundary, to the facts of particular cases. However Gault P argues that once land is 
195 Ngati Apa, above, para 154, per Keith and Anderson JJ. 
196 That section reads: "Whenever in any grant the ocean, sea, or any sound, bay or creek or any part 
thereof affected by the ebb or flow of the tide is described as forming the whole or part of the 
boundary of the land to be granted, such boundary or part thereof shall be deemed and taken to be the 
line of high-water mark at ordinary tides." 
197 Ngati Apa, above, para 157. 
198 Ngati Apa, above, para 157. 
199 Ngati Apa, above, para 89. 
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investigated by the ative Land Court and interests in Native Lands bordering the 
sea were extinguished and substituted with grants of fee simple. 
[i]t does not seem open now to find that there could have been strips of land between 
the claimed land bordering the sea and the sea that were not investigated and in which 
interests were not identified and extinguished once Crown grants were made. 200 
This line of reasoning in effect reinstates the ratio of Ninety-Mile Beach. The 
Land Cami may find a properiy right only where coastal land was purchased or 
investigated and the sea was not stated as the boundary. This minority approach 
eliminates the ability to find customary interests where the sea is stated as the 
boundary, as it was very cormnon for the Crown Deeds to do as such.201 
Criticisms made by the majority lend support to the view that the 1963 Court of 
Appeal was likewise wrong in Re the Bed of the Wanganui River. In particular, it's 
finding that Maori customary title in navigable riverbeds ceased by application of the 
ad medium filum aquae cormnon law principle. Following the reasoning of Ngati 
Apa as the common law is imported as far as local circumstances allow, an good 
argument can be made that analogously that if custom is shown to give interests in 
bed of navigable rivers, there would be no room for a contrary presumption derived 
from English common law. 202 
However due to the Coal Mines Act, in Bennion's view the practical outcome 
of any court action is likely to be compensation. 203 Section 14 of the Coal Mines Act 
Amendment Act, that applicable legislation, provide that except where granted by 
the Crown, the beds of navigable rivers "shall remain and shall be deemed to have 
always been vested in the Crown; and ... all minerals (including coal) within the such 
200 Ngati Apa, above, para 121. 
201 Tom Bennion, "The Claim of the Crown is Weak" (May 2003) Maori Law Review 1, 2. 
202 Ngati Apa, above, para 86. 
203 Section 261(2) of the Coal Mines Act 1979 reads: "Save where the bed of a navigable river is or 
has been granted by the Crown, the bed of such river shall remain and shall be deemed to have always 
been vested in the Crown; and, without limiting in any way the rights of the Crown thereto, all 
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bed shall be the absolute property of the Crown." As Keith and Anderson JJ note, the 
plu·ase "absolute prope1iy" indicates both radical title and beneficial ownership, 
indicated that section 14 extinguishes any Maori customary rights in the bed of 
navigable rivers. 204 
B Foreshore and Seabed Endowment Revestillg Act 1991 
The Crown asserted that section 9A vests all foreshore and seabed land in the 
Crown. 205 Section 9A was inconsistent with any Maori customary title to foreshore 
and seabed, it was submitted, as it refers to all foreshore and seabed and not just that 
land revested under section 5 of principal Act. The Court rejected this reading of 
section 9A, rather finding that that section applied to land which was property of the 
Crown, of which Maori customary land was excluded. 206 
The Chief Justice reasons that the purpose of section 9A is to set up a different 
regime for land "for the time being vested in the Crown" according to if they are 
foreshore and seabed lands or not. 207 Elias CJ draws an analogy between the land of 
which is the subject of section 9A208, with the definition of Crown land in the Land 
Act 1948.209 The latter specifically excludes "any Maori land". As Maori freehold 
land will be "land held by any person in fee simple" it is excluded from section 
9A(l)(b). 210 
The Court found the language of section 9A(l) to be incapable of being read as 
effecting a vesting of land. According to the Court it simply identifies the subject of 
minerals (including coal) within such bed shall be the absolute property of the Crown." The original 
declaration being found ins 14 of the Coal-Mines Act Amendment Act 1903 
204 Tom Bennion, "The Claim of the Crown is Weak" (May 2003) Maori Law Review 1, 2. 
205 Ngati Apa v Attorney General ( 19 June 2003) Court of Appeal CA 173/01, 75/02, para 68. 
206 Ngati Apa, above, para 73. 
207 Ngati Apa, above, para 68. 
208 Land which is "for the time being vested in the Crown, but for the time being is not set aside for 
any public purpose or held for any person in fee simple." 
209 "[L ]and vested in Her Majesty which is not for the time being set aside for any public purpose or 
held by any person in fee simple." 
210 Ngati Apa, above, para 69. 
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section 9A as foreshore and seabed which "is for the time being vested in the 
Crown". Radical title in all land being vested for all time, is clearly inconsistent with 
references to "for the time being."21
1 Moreover, the reference to land vested in the 
Crown lands defines the foreshore and seabed that would otherwise be available for 
disposal by the Crown. According to the Chief Justice such land has always excluded 
Maori customary land. 212 
Even if such reasoning was incorrect, the Chief Justice, Keith and Anderson JJ 
and Gault P viewed Maori customary interest as an interest in land protected by 
subsection 2.2 13 In the Court ' s view, there was nothing about the legislation being 
sufficiently ' clear and plain to extinguish existing Maori customary property. 
XIII EXTINGUISHMENT: SEABED 
A The Territorial Seas Acts 
It was submitted by the Crown that section 7 of the Territorial Sea and 
Fishing Zone Act 1965 and the Territorial Sea, Contiguous Zone and Exclusive 
Economic Zone Act 1977 either was consistent with the non-recognition of Maori 
customary land as part of the seabed, or alternatively, extinguished that status.
2 14 The 
Court of Appeal found otherwise, concluding that there was no expropriatory 
purpose about either Act in regards to Ma01i property. Moreover, that the seabed is 
vested in the Crown is not inconsistent with the continuing existence of Maori 
customary property. The principal focus of the 1965 Act was in establishing "as 
against the world the 12 mile fishing zone" a matter of sovereignty not beneficial 
ownership. Likewise the primary purpose of the 1977 Act was to establish the 
exclusive economic zone.21 5 As the language is deeming, preservation of existing 
property, compatibility of radical title with Maori customary title and the lack of a 
211 Ngati Apa, above, para 70. 
2 12 Ngati Apa, above, para 71 . 
213 Ngati Apa, above, para 74. 
21 4 Ngati Apa, above, para 113 . 
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direct intention to expropriate make it impossible for the statute to extinguish Maori 
customary title.216 
A reading of the Parliamentary debates supports these conclusions. In tenns of 
the Territorial Sea and Fishing Zone Bill 1965, it is clear that the legislature did not 
tum their minds to the question of the possibility of Maori customary rights. The 
purpose of the Bill was to "define for the first time, the base line from which the 3-
mile territorial sea is measured"217 and to establish a 9-mile fishing zone outside of 
the 3 miles. 218 Consequently the debate is focused on these two issues. This is not 
surprising given that the Crown had presumed that they owned the 3-mile territorial 
sea. The question of Maori customary title over this area simply did not factor into 
the Bill ' s debate. 
B Resource Management Act 1991 
It was argued by ew Zealand Marine Farming Association that claims to 
ownership of property in foreshore and seabed were inconsistent with the Resource 
Management Act 1991, specifically the controls of the coastal marine area. Further it 
was asserted that only Maori customary property less than ownership can be 
recognised under the scheme of the Resource Management Act.
219 The Chief Justice 
noted that while the Resource Management Act may restrict activities of those with 
interests in Maori customary property, as with all owners of foreshore, seabed and 
ordinary land. However the statutory management of natural resources not 
inconsistent with existing property rights 'as a matter of custom'. "The legislation 
does not effect any extinguishment of such property. "
220 
215 Ngati Apa, above, para 162. 
216 Ngati Apa, above, para 63 . 
217 Rt Hon Keith Holyoake (Prime Minister) (2 June 1965) 342 NZPD 60-61. 
218 Rt Hon Keith Holyoake (Prime Minister) (2 June 1965) 342 ZPD 60-61. 
219 Ngati Apa, above, para 75. 
220 Ngati Apa, above, para 76 
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XIV MAORI LAND COURT'S POWERS 
As noted by the Chief Justice, the Comi of Appeal decision does not resolve 
the questions pe1iaining to the nature of the property interest in the claimed area. 
That is whether those interests amount to a fee simple interest, or something less.
221 
A subsequent question of law which would require resolution is the extent or 
otherwise of the Maori Land Comi to recognise interests in land less not equivalent 
to fee simple.222 
Notably the Native Land Court did once explicitly posses the power to grant 
less than exclusive rights. 223 However the ability of the Maori Land Court to 
recognise non-territorial rights was revoked by sections 84 to 91 of the Native Land 
Act 1909. Sections 161 and 162 of the Maori Affairs Act 1953 duplicates these 
sections. It is due to these enactments that rights less than fee simple could not be 
recognised in Ninety Mile Beach. These provisions have since been repealed, 
however the ability of the current Maori Land Court to recognise rights less than fee 
simple remains uncertain. 
While Elias CJ was content to leave the question open for the Maori Land 
Court to explore, Gault P doubted the ability to recognise rights less than fee simple. 
The President stating that under the particular Part VI of the Te Ture Whenua Maori 
Act, the concern was with land capable of supporting an estate in fee simple and 
ownership interests capable of conversion to registration under the Land Transfer 
Act. "Interests in land in the nature of usufructuary rights or reflecting mana, though 
they may be capable of recognition both in tikanga Maori and in a developed 
22 1 Ngati Apa, above, para 9. 
222 Ngati Apa, above, para 10. 
223 Section 23 of the Native Lands Act 1865 " .. . shall order a ce1iificate of title to be made and issued 
which certificate shall specify the names of the persons ... who own or are interested in the land 
describing the nature of such estate or interest and describing the land comprised in such certificate or 
the Court may in its discretion refuse to order a certificate to issue to the claimant or any other 
person." In Kauwaeranga Judgment, Fenton CJ refused to issue a certificate of title recognising 'an 
absolute freehold interest in the soil', rather the claimants were issued with an order to "the full, 
exclusive, and undisturbed possession of all the rights and privileges over the locus in quo .. . which 
they or their ancestors have ever exercised. 
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c01mnon law info1med by tikanga Maori, are not interests with which the provisions 
of Part VI are concerned."224 
If Gault's reasoning holds true, this gives weight to McHugh's argument that 
non-ten-itorial rights will subsist despite the transformation from Maori customary 
land to Maori freehold land. As the doctrine of aboriginal title "recognises both the 
title itself and the traditional incidents of Maori land tenure" if the rules of customary 
title defined by Part VI do not include all the incidents of Maori aboriginal title225 
this leaves open the possibility of non-territorial rights subsisting in area of the 
foreshore that have been transformed from customary into Maori freehold land under 
Part VI. As the statute fails to accommodate the full common law recognition of 
tribal title, the change in status may only result in the partial extinguishment of the 
common law aboriginal title, leaving non-territo1ial rights to subsist. 
226 However, if 
the interest amounts to a fishing right, the question remains whether that right has 
been extinguished by the fisheries settlement and The Treaty of Waitangi (Fisheries 
Settlement) Act 1992. Given the strong approach taken by the Court of Appeal on 
the language of extinguishing statutes, the statute requires careful scrutinisation. 
A further question left open was whether the land court could make a vesting 
order, if the interest is found to be equivalent to a fee simple, once a status order is 
issued. The proposition of provisional title under the Land Transfer Act troubled 
Tipping J, but in his view this could not amount to extinguishment of customary 
property rights in the foreshore and seabed. 227 This is particularly so given that a 
vesting order was not inevitable, and that in some circumstances it may be 
appropriate to decline to make a vesting order. 228 
224 Ngati Apa, above, para 106. 
225 PG McHugh "Aboriginal servitudes and the Land Transfer Act 1952" (1986) 16 VUWLR 313, 
324. 
226 McHugh, above, 324. 
227 Ngati Apa, above, para 195. 
228 Ngati Apa, above, para 196. 
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XV CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
A Role of the Judiciary 
The afte1math of the Court of Appeal's decision saw a range of accusations 
made in a number of directions. One poignant criticism directed at the Court of 
Appeal itself was that it had diverged into making law instead of simply interpreting 
the law. Critics of Ngati Apa have indeed labeled it as an illustration of "judicial 
activism." In the author's view this stance is inco1Tect. To a large extent the case 
does not state anything new. It merely follows settled domestic and international 
principles in regards to pre-existing property rights. In regards to Ninety Mile Beach, 
it has been shown, as the Court of Appeal itself illustrates, that this case was based 
on erroneous assumptions and bad law. In finding that legislation was insufficient to 
extinguish Maori customary title,. the Court merely interpreted the law as written by 
the Legislature. 
To reiterate, the Court did not say that there were customary rights in the 
foreshore and seabed, but rather that the Maori Land Court had jurisdiction to 
entertain such claims. The Court identified many hurdles and some members of the 
Bench were indeed doubtful of the success of claims to the Maori Land Court. 
However regardless of these concerns, the Court's na1Tow jurisdictional finding has 
been a long time Maori applicants who have been precluded from asserting their 
customary rights in the Maori Land Court for at least forty years. For the Crown it 
provided a rude awakening to a fact which it had been aware of at least since 1935; 
that its title to the foreshore and seabed rested on weak foundations. 
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XVI PUBLIC POLICY 
In the past, the underlying theme driving the Courts refusal to recogmse 
customary interests in the foreshore and seabed is the concern for public policy. This 
is evidenced in Kauwaeranga where Fenton CJ stated that: 229 
I cannot contemplate without uneasiness the evil consequences which might ensue 
from judicially declaring that the soil of the foreshore of the Colony will be vested 
absolutely in the Native if they can prove certain acts of ownership. 
In Ninety Mile Beach orth J was clearly concerned that finding in favour of 
Maori, may lead to an owner of property adjoining the ocean having title to the high 
water mark, having no legal right of access to the sea. 230 Likewise, Ellis J explicitly 
stated, "[t]he consequences of agreeing with the arguments adduced by the 
applicants would be highly detrimental to citizens as a whole, including Maori other 
than the applicants."231 In effect, the property rights of owners other than the 
claimants in each case, were given more weight, than the property rights held by 
Maori. The fact that the rights of Maori were being ignored was a necessary effect of 
the greater public good. This public policy debate, while it has fo1med the backdrop 
to the case law, has now been propound to the forefront of the foreshore and seabed 
debate as a result of the Comi of Appeal's decision and the government's subsequent 
decision to legislate on the matter. 
XVII GOVERNMENTS RESPONSE 
At the time of writing the Marlborough Port Autho1ity is the only party 
contemplating appealing the Court of Appeal's decision to the Privy Council. On 18 
August 2003, however, the government released its proposal to resolve what it sees 
as an unsatisfactory situation for the Crown. It intends to pre-empt any efforts to 
229 Kauwaeranga Judgm ent (1870) 4 Hauraki MB 236; reprinted in (1984) VUWLR 227,244. 
230 Jn Re Ninety Mile Beach [1963] NZLR 461 , 467 (CA). 
23 1 Ngati Apa, above, para 32. 
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convert Maori customary title to the foreshore and seabed into fee simple. The crux 
of the proposal being that Maori may no longer pursue claims through the Maori 
Land Court, as pem1itted by the Court of Appeal decision. Rather the foreshore and 
seabed are to become "public domain" neither owned by the Crown nor by Maori. 
Notably the foreshore and seabed issue impacts other major policy movements 
currently being unde1iaken by the government. The development of the Ocean's 
Policy, the aquaculture reforn1s and the issue of accessing the New Zealand 
coastline, together with the foreshore and seabed issue amount to a mammoth 
project, which involve many stakeholders. 
The general theme of the government's proposal, which is evident throughout 
the document, is the subordination of Maori customary rights. This is illustrated by 
the continual reference to 'customary interests' rather than customary rights or 
customary title. Characterizing something as a 'right' tends to immunize it from 
challenge. To transgress a right is to c01mnit a wrong. 232 Thus in defining something 
as a right, it is more or less removed from political challenge. 233 The choice of the 
tem1 ' interest' seems to indicate to the author that the government is seeking to avoid 
any notion that Maori may possess rights, which if transgressed, as the government's 
proposal no doubt will, would be to commit a wrong. To classify what Maori hold 
as an interest therefore makes it politically easier to limit. 
Carrying on the theme of subordination, the proposal begins by incorrectly 
defining Maori customary rights as "a way in which the law can protect, for 
indigenous people, their interests in and associations with particular places of 
historic, cultural or spiritual significance." 234 However the customary right itself is 
232 G Dinwoodie, W Hennessey and S Perlmutter International Intellectual Property Law and Policy 
(Lexis Nexis, 2001 ) 433. 
233 Dinwoodie, above. 
234 Rt Hon Helen Clark, Prime Minister Foreshore and Seabed: Protecting Public Access and 
Customary Rights: Consultation Paper (Wellington, 2003) 7and 25 . 
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not to be confused with the method by which those rights are recognised. 235 Such a 
statement ignores the role that tikanga plays in defining customary rights and 
overlooks the test for Maori customary land as defined in the Te Ture Whenua Maori 
Act, as "[l]and that is held by Maori in accordance with Tikanga Maori ... " 
Secondly, the document states that the Maori Land Court system "was designed 
with only "dry land" in mind."236 While the current Maori Land Court has undergone 
much reform since its first inception, this statement runs contrary to the early 
practice of the Native Land Court, as detailed previously, to grant titles to the 
foreshore. It also runs contrary to the position taken by the early colonial government 
by implicitly acknowledging that the Native Land Court did in fact have jurisdiction 
over this area. Such misleading statements are influential in persuading readers to 
form a particular view on the issue. This is particularly a concern given it is on the 
information presented in the government's proposal that the public are asked to forn1 
their own view on the issues and make submissions the proposal. 
What precisely the legislation will look like is not yet certain. The proposal 
itself lacks any real detail and as such it is difficult to give substantive comment on 
it. The government intends to incorporate what it sees as four key principles of 
access, regulation, protection and certainty. These will now be examined in turn. 
A Principle of Access 
The government considers that the foreshore and seabed should be accessible 
to all New Zealanders. There can no denying that accessing beaches is of 
fundamental importance as an integral part of the New Zealand way of life. However 
Maori have continually denied that they ever intended to deny access to beaches if 
title to land were to be confirmed in the Maori Land Court. Rather the customary 
235 Moana Jackson "There are obligations there" A Consideration of Maori Responsibilities and 
Obligations in Regard to the Seabed and Foreshore <http://www.arena.org.nz/sbmoana.htm> (last 
accessed 1 October 2003). 
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principle of manaakitanga dictates against any blanket denial of access to either the 
foreshore or seabed. 23 7 Relying on customary principles to maintain accessibility to 
the foreshore and seabed, however, is a leap of faith which the government and 
indeed many members of the public are clearly not prepared to take. Legislation for 
many is the only way to ensme the public's rights are maintained. 
The government proposes to declare the foreshore and seabed to be "public 
domain", neither owned by Maori or the Crown. In doing so the government wishes 
to di\·orce concepts of ownership and title from the foreshore and seabed. 238 
Interestingly there is some irony in the fear of Maori possibly having the ability to 
sell their title to the foreshore and seabed, as it was the ative Land Court which was 
established to transforn1 collective Maori interests into freehold title.239 
B Principle of Regulation 
Under this principle the Crown legitimately reiterates that it is responsible for 
regulating the use of the foreshore and the seabed, on behalf of all present and future 
generations of New Zealanders. However, there is no mention that Maori may have a 
role in developing regulation of the coastal area. Further, this principle runs the risk 
of demeaning the 'public domain' notion, as the government will effectively be in 
the position of the owner of the foreshore and seabed. 240 
236 Rt Hon Helen Clark, Prime Yl:inister Foreshore and Seabed: Protecting Public Access and 
Cusroma,y Rig/us: Consuliation Paper (Wellington, 2003) 10. 
237 Moana Jackson Stwement By gati Kahungunu on the Government Proposals on the Foreshore 
and Seabed. (September 12, 2003) 
<http: www.teope.co.nz pdf submissions gatiKahungunu _ Omahu.PDF> (last accessed 21 
September 2003). 
238 
Rt Hon Helen Clark, Prime Minister Foreshore and Seabed. Protecting Public Access and 
Customa,y Rights: Consultation Paper (Wellington. 2003) 16. 
239 Jackson, above. 
240 Jackson, above. 
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C Principle of Protection 
The principal of protection entails the establishment of processes to enable the 
customary interests of whanau, hapu and iwi in the foreshore and seabed to be 
acknowledged, and specific rights to be identified and protected. 241 Two options are 
identified to enable recognition and protection of customary interests. 242 The body 
chosen would identify and record customary interests that amounted to customary 
rights in the foreshore and seabed. 243 
According to this section of the proposal, customary rights are to be awarded to 
whanau, hapu or iwi; exercised collectively and in support of customary activities of 
the whanau, hapu or iwi; and not able to be alienated or otherwise used for 
commercial purposes, or in any way used for pecuniary gain or trade. 244 The 
exclusion of the commercial element, accords with judicial tendency to read down 
customary rights. 245 More significantly, this approach prejudges the nature and 
extent of customary rights. 246 The nature of the customary right will, rather, depend 
on the customary law of the particular group. 
D Principle of Certainty 
The final principle suggests that there should be certainty for those who use 
and administer the foreshore and seabed about the range of rights that are relevant to 
their actions. Clearly certainty is important for all stakeholders involved. However 
241 Rt Hon Helen Clark, Prime Minister Foreshore and Seabed: Protecting Public Access and 
Customa,y Rights: Consultation Paper (Wellington, 2003), 27, 
242 Rt Hon Helen Clark, Prime Minister Foreshore and Seabed: Protecting Public Access and 
Customary Rights: Consultation Paper (Wellington, 2003) 27. 
243 Rt Hon Helen Clark, Prime Minister Foreshore and Seabed: Protecting Public Access and 
Customary Rights: Consultation Paper (Wellington, 2003) 27. 
244 Rt Hon Helen Clark, Prime Minister Foreshore and Seabed: Protecting Public Access and 
Customa,y Rights: Consultation Paper (Wellington, 2003) 30. 
245 Andrew Erueti "Native Title Claims to Sea Country" [200 1] TZLJ 415 , 417. 
246 Te Ope Mana a Tai Submissions on the Crown 's Proposal to Protect Public Access and Customary 
Rights (October 2003) < http ://www. teope.co .nz/pdt:'submissions T e0pe0ct03.PDF> (last accessed 7 
October 2003). 
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to make educated decisions and to contemplate the future needs of Maori. 
252 The 
government issued its proposal August 18 2003 and required all submissions on the 
proposal to be in by October 3 2003. In that timeframe the government also 
undertook a series of consultation hui around New Zealand in an attempt to fulfil its 
duty of consultation. However, given the complexity of legal issues involved, the 
timeframe for submissions set out by the government is arguably inadequate and 
unreasonable for Maori to undertake full and considered advice on the issues. While 
the government seeks to resolve the issue expediently as possible, this should not be 
at the expense of fair oppo1iunity of Maori, as Treaty partners, to obtain legal advice 
and to consider their response to the government's proposal. As such, the procedure 
cannot be regarded as active protection of Maori interests.253 
B Substantive Breach 
I Principle of Partnership 
One of the fundamental principles of the Treaty is the notion of partnership 
between the Crown and Maori. In the Report of the Waitangi Tribunal on the 
Muriwhenua Fishing Claim254 , the Tribunal found that the kawanatanga of the 
Crown must not be exercised in a way which reduces the rangatiratanga of iwi, as 
guaranteed in Aiiicle II, to exercise control over their resources. 255 The Tribunal 
describes rangatiratanga as 'the exercise by Maori of autonomy, authority, self-
government, or self-regulation over their tribal domain .... it encapsulates their right 
to the development of their resources."256 It was found in the Ahu Moana Report that 
252 Waitangi Tribunal Ahu Moana: The Aquaculture and Marine Farming Report: Wai 953 
(Legislation Direct, Wellington, 2002), 70. 
253 Waitangi Tribunal Ahu Moana: The Aquaculture and Marine Farming Report: Wai 953 
(Legislation Direct, Wellington, 2002), 70. 
254 Waitangi Tribunal Report of the Waitangi Tribunal on the Muriwhenua Fishing Claim, 2°d ed 
(Government Printing Office, 1989). 
255 Waitangi Tribunal Report of the Waitangi Tribunal on the Muriwhenua Fishing Claim, 2"d ed 
(Government Printing Office, 1989). 
256 Waitangi Tribunal Ahu Moana: The Aquaculture and Marine Farming Report: Wai 953 
(Legislation Direct, Wellington, 2002), 64 . 
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the claimants traditionally exercised authority over the coastal manne area and, 
significantly, 'it is likely that other Maori will be able to establish similar rights. '
257 
On the face of the government's proposal, it is an undoubted breach of Article 
II of the Treaty, in which Maori are guaranteed exclusive and undisturbed possession 
of their lands and taonga. Maori customary title will be abrogated by the proposal, in 
that it will be restricted by the terms set out in the protection principle, rather than 
determined by tikanga Maori. Even if Maori could prove that they exercised 
sufficient control over the foreshore and seabed to amount to a customary title, under 
the proposal no such title could be awarded. Rather merely interests could be 
recognised and even then these are limited by inalienability and non-commerciality. 
As such the exercise of kawanatanga by the government reduces the ability of Maori 
to exercise autonomy and self-regulation over their domain. 
Moreover, in the Report on the Muriwhenua Fishing Claim it was 
stated that the 1ight to develop and progress in all areas is and inherent 
right of all people. 258 
C]ommercial development of resomces does not depend upon proof of a pre-
Treaty commercial expertise. A treaty that denied a development right to Maori 
would not have been signed ... It is the inherent right of all people to develop and 
progress in all areas. No on has seriously suggested that Maori could not 
develop their lands and sell the produce of their industry. 
According to the principle of protection, customary rights are to be awarded 
collectively and not able to be alienated or otherwise used for commercial purposes. 
This te1m runs in direct contrast to the development right arising from the Treaty as 
identified in the Report on the Muriwhenua Fishing Claim. It also ignores previous 
257 Waitangi Tribunal Ahu Moana: The Aquaculture and Marine Farming Report: Wai 953 
(Legislation Direct, Wellington, 2002), 64. 
258 Waitangi Tribunal Report of the Waitangi Tribunal on the Muriwhenua Fishing Claim, 2°d ed 
(Government Printing Office, 1989) section 11.6.6. 
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practice of the government which recognises the right to development, see the 1992 
Fisheries Settlement. 259 
2 Active Protection 
Recently in the Ahu Moana Report, the Waitangi Tribunal reviewed the 
conduct of the government in regards to aquaculture refonn. The Tribw1al found that 
the duty of active protection applied to Maori interests in aquaculture and marine 
fanning. 
The duty of actively protect requires that, to the extent that Maori interests in 
aquaculture and marine farming have been or will be prejudicially affected by 
Crown acts, practices or omissions, the Crown must correct that imbalance and 
remove the prejudice. This duty requires the Crown to make informed decisions, 
but, because the Crown has not fully investigated the nature and extent of the Maori 
interest in marine farming, it cannot be said with confidence that it has discharged 
. d . 1 th . 260 its uty to active y protect at mterest. 
The duty is further described as 'onerous' that in the context of the aquaculture 
report was not met without having a mechanism to fully investigate the Maori 
interest and also by not consulting with Maori.
261 However the Tribm1al went on to 
state that there is nothing inherently wrong with the reforms proceeding without the 
claims being settled and rights not adequately defined,
262 as long as potential claims 
259 Notably the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to inquire into commercial fisheries, or the Deed of 
Settlement 1992. Section 6(7) reads: 
"Notwithstanding anything in this Act or any other Act or rule of law, on and from the 
commencement of this subsection the Tribunal shall not have jurisdiction to inquire or further inquire 
into, or to make any finding or recommendation in respect of 
(a) Conunercial fishing or commercial fisheries (within the meaning of the Fisheries Act 1983); or(b) 
The Deed of Settlement between the Crown and Maori dated the 23rd day of September 1992; or(c) 
Any enactment, to the extent that it relates to such conunercial fishing or commercial fisheries." 
260 Waitangi Tribunal Ahu Moana: The Aquaculture and Marine Farming Report: Wai 953 
(Legislation Direct, Wellington, 2002), 67. 
26 1 Waitangi Tribunal Ahu Moana : The Aquaculture and Marine Farming Report: Wai 953 
(Legislation Direct, Wellington, 2002), 68. 
262Waitangi Tribunal Ahu Moana: The Aquaculture and Marine Farming Report: Wai 953 
(Legislation Direct, Wellington, 2002), 76. 
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are "provided for in a suitable mam1er, the Treaty obligation is discharged. ' 263 One of 
the questions that the Waitangi Tribunal will look into is on what basis can the 
Crown justifiably abrogate Maori interests "without making a thorough assessment 
of the nature and extent of that title or interest."264 
On the basis of the Ahu Moana Report the question becomes whether the 
proposed provision to investigate Maori interests provides for future claims 'in a 
suitable mam1er'. While the government's proposal indicates that Maori can have 
their customary interests ascertained possibly in the Maori Land Court, it is difficult 
to see how the proposal actively protects Maori interests when the effect of it is to 
deny Maori from having their customary title recognised and enforced in the Maori 
Land Court. However this must be weighed against legitimate interests of 
government to legislate for the good of the public. 
C Summary 
The proposal of the government as outline in the consultation document leaves 
something to be desired. In attempting to appease the general public, the proposal 
also subordinates the genuine rights of Maori and runs the risk of creating new 
Treaty grievances. The findings of the Waitangi Tribunal, while recommendatory 
only, will be awaited with interest. This is particularly so as the Tribunal "is uniquely 
placed to add value to the legal and political debate about the foreshore and 
seabed. "265 
XIX CONCLUSION 
Regardless of the final shape of the government's policy, the Court of Appeal's 
Ngati Apa decision will remain a landmark case in New Zealand. The ridding of two 
263 Waitangi Tribunal Ahu Moana: The Aquaculture and Marine Farming Report: Wai 953 
(Legislation Direct, Wellington, 2002), 76. 
264 Waitangi Tribunal Memorandum and Directions of Judge CM Wainwright: Wai I 07 I #2.131 
question (5)(a) 7. 
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discredited authoritie , 111 Re ,\ inety 1\Jile Beach and the source of many judicial 
failings, Wi Parara, is itself a success for the ew Zealand legal system. Likewise 
Court's authoratiYe tatements on aboriginal title. ·while this may be of little 
consolation to faori now, it at least 
It is debatable whether the government's proposal, if enacted, would be 
constitutional. In effect the proposal denies, where proven to exist, Maori from 
enforcing their customary title as against the Crown. There is little doubt that such a 
proposal breaches the Treaty of \ aitangi. The proposal as it stands will deny the 
ability of lfaori to enforce property rights . In the Crown's view this is necessary in 
the public interest. Ho\\·eyer this reasoning confuses the "public (non-Maori) 
interest" with the right of the "Maori public" and constrains the ability of Maori to 
exercise the rights and authority contained in the Treaty of Waitangi. 
266 
This nexus between the property rights of Maori and the 'rights' of ordinary 
New Zealanders to access the foreshore and seabed is clearly a difficult contest to 
resolve. While the Yiews at present appear to be polarized, some compromise is 
required. Compromise does not mean that one set of rights yield completely to the 
other, as appears to be the case from the government's proposal. Rather genuine 
dialogue must be entered into on the basis of partnership and good faith. Only then 
will a satisfactory solution be reached. 
In many respects, the narrow foreshore and seabed issue forms a part of the 
wider debate over the constitutional relationship between Maori and the Crown. 
What is certain is that the foreshore and seabed issue provides the nation with an 
opportunity to forge new paths in personal and constitutional relations. The question 
is whether lessons can be learnt from the past, to realise this opportunity. The 
challenge has been laid. 
265 Waitangi Tribunal Memorandum and Directions of Judge CM Wainwright: Wail 07 I #2.131 , 3. 
266 Moana Jackson "There are obligations there" A Consideration of Maori Responsibilities and 
Obligations in Regard to the Seabed and Foreshore <http i www.arena.org.nz/sbmoana.htrn> (last 
accessed I October 2003 ). 
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Appendix 
Waitangi Tribunal Memorandum and Directions of Judge CM Wainwright: Wai 
10 71 #2. 131. 
Confirmed Issues set by the Waitangi Tribunal : 
(I) Generally, and not in relation to any particular group, what are the Maori interests in the 
foreshore and seabed? 
(2) How might those interests be recognised in a Maori customary title to the foreshore and 
seabed? Consider: 
a. In what circumstances might the Maori customary title equate to a freehold title? 
b. What kinds of evidence would be required to support recognition of customary title? 
c. What title, shore of freehold title, might be recognised, and how would such 
recognition be effected? 
d. Does the Sealord Deal (and implementing legislation) preclude reliance on use of 
the fisheries resources as a basis for demonstrating customary title? 
(3) How are those interests impact upon by the existing 
a. Environmental management regime; 
b. Crown minerals management regime; 
c. Aquaculture and marine farming regime; 
d. Regime for the management of commercial and recreational, and customary fishing; 
e. Private property rights; 
f. Relevant international instruments? 
(4) Do the Crown's proposed policies comprise an abrogation of other interference with Maori 
customary title or other interests in the foreshore and seabed, and/or the means for 
investigating that title/interest and giving it legal recognition and protection? 
(5) If the answer to (4) is "yes", on what basis (at law or under the Treaty_ is the Crown justified 
in that abrogation or interference without: 
a. Making a thorough assessment of the nature and extent of that title or interest; 
and/or 
b. Providing a regime for compensation? 
(6) How are Maori prejudiced, or likely to be prejudiced, by the Crown's proposed policy? 
(7) What options are available for mitigating and/or averting that prejudice. 
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f. Relevant international instruments? 
( 4) Do the Crown ' s proposed policies comprise an abrogation of other interference with Maori 
customary title or other interests in the foreshore and seabed, and/or the means for 
investigating that title/interest and giving it legal recognition and protection? 
( 5) If the answer to ( 4) is "yes", on what basis ( at law or under the Treaty_ is the Crown justified 
in that abrogation or interference without: 
a. Making a thorough assessment of the nature and extent of that title or interest; 
and/or 
b. Providing a regime for compensation? 
(6) How are Maori prejudiced, or likely to be prejudiced, by the Crown's proposed policy? 
(7) What options are available for mitigating and/or averting that prejudice. 
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